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Białynicka-Birula Joanna (Kolegium Nauk o Zarządzaniu i Jakości)
Rola technik aukcyjnych w kształtowaniu cen licytowanych produktów
The Role of Auction Techniques in Shaping the Auction Prices of Products
Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie, 2002, nr 586, s. 119-132, bibliogr. 19 poz.
Aukcja pierwszej ceny, Aukcje, Cena jednostkowa produktu, Analiza porównawcza, Techniki aukcyjne
First price auction, Auctions, Product unit prices, Comparative analysis, Auction techniques
W opracowaniu omówiono modele aukcyjne. Przedstawiono związek pomiędzy zastosowaną techniką aukcyjną a wielkością osiągniętej ceny. Zaprezentowano i scharakteryzowano główne techniki aukcyjne: angielską, holenderską, pierwszej ceny, oraz drugiej ceny (technika Vickreya).

The aim of this article is to illustrate the relationship between the type of auction technique used during an auction and the price obtained. In the first part of the paper, the author discusses four basic auction techniques, i.e., methods for determining the price of a product: the English auction, Dutch auction, first price auction, and second price auction (Vickrey auction). The author pays particular attention to the characteristic features of each of these auction techniques. She endeavours to describe the relationships that exist between prices determined using different auction techniques. The author makes the assumption that bidding technique determines the auction price, and thus the auction price of an item may vary depending on the auction technique used. In the second part of the paper, the author describes various auction models, established on the basis of auction theory, which endeavour to identify the relationships in question. The paper constitutes an attempt to provide a complex description and analysis of the auction models presented in Western literature on auction theory. (original abstract)
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