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Author
Raczyński Mirosław (Kolegium Ekonomii, Finansów i Prawa)
Title
Teoretyczne uzasadnienia niezależności regulatorów usług użyteczności publicznej
Theoretical Justifications for the Independence of Public Utility Service Regulators
Source
Zeszyty Naukowe / Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, 2007, nr 758, s. 97-107, bibliogr. 20 poz.
Keyword
Teoria ekonomii, Teoria usług, Usługi publiczne, Usługi użyteczności publicznej
Economic theory, Theory of services, Public services, Public utility services
Note
summ.
Abstract
Przedstawiono przyczyny tworzenia niezależnych agencji regulacyjnych w dziedzinie usług publicznych formułowane na gruncie teorii ekonomii. Omówiono dwa aspekty braku wiarygodności: niespójność w czasie, która jest następstwem sprzeczności między krótko-i długookresowymi celami prowadzonej polityki, oraz niepewnością polityczną, wynikającą z konfliktu między obecnymi i przyszłymi mocodawcami.

In this article, the author presents theories that explain the reasons for establishing independent regulatory bodies for public utility services. He discusses explanations for such actions formulated on the basis of agency theory; explanations that see in this independence a desire on the part of politicians to shift responsibility for costly decisions; and explanations that analyse independence as a method of addressing the problem of the lack of regulatory policy credibility due to its inconsistency over time and political uncertainty. The author also presents hypotheses developed within the framework of sociological and historical institutionalism. He contends that neither agency theory, nor the desire to shift responsibility, satisfactorily explain independence. On the other hand, the inconsistency over time of regulatory policy and political uncertainty, by making it necessary to take steps to increase policy credibility, lead to the granting of real independence to the regulator. In turn, studies in sociological and historical institutionalism explain the differentiation of regulatory institutions across countries. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
Full text
CUE campus access only
Bibliography
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ISSN
1898-6447
Language
pol
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