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Author
Prokop Jacek, Baranowska-Prokop Ewa
Title
Asymetria informacji a transakcje wiązane
Information Asymmetry and Tie-in Transactions
Source
Gospodarka Narodowa, 2006, nr 7-8, s. 9-25, bibliogr. 25 poz.
Keyword
Asymetria informacji, Transakcje wiązane, Nowe technologie, Zakup
Information asymmetry, Tie-in transaction, High-tech, Purchasing
Abstract
Celem niniejszej pracy jest zbadanie, czy w przypadku asymetrii informacji zakupy dóbr kapitałowych przy wykorzystaniu transakcji wiązanych rzeczywiście mogą stanowić dla przedsiębiorstw korzystniejszą formę handlu niż nabycie tych dóbr w wyniku konwencjonalnej transakcji rynkowej. Autorzy proponują własny model handlu, w którym przedsiębiorstwo nabywające technologię o nieznanej jakości może dokonać zakupu albo za pomocą zwykłej transakcji rynkowej, albo poprzez transakcję wiązaną. Na podstawie analizy w ramach tego modelu udowadniają, że w przypadku znacznej niepewności co do jakości nabywanej technologii transakcja wiązana może stać się preferowaną formą wymiany.

The article sets out to determine if tie-in transactions can be a more favorable form of buying capital goods for enterprises than ordinary market transactions in the event of an information asymmetry. The authors present a model situation in which an enterprise from a less developed country decides to buy technology from a company based in a highly developed country. The quality of the technology is unknown to the buyer, who has two forms of transactions to choose from: a market transaction or a tie-in. The authors prove that in the event of considerable uncertainty about the quality of the technology involved, tie-ins may be the preferred form of trade. Such transactions play the role of specific insurance in case the technology purchased proves to be of substandard quality. Tie-in transactions are a reliable signal of the quality of capital goods if there is an information asymmetry between the seller and the buyer. They represent a rational response to conditions limiting market exchange.
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
Bibliography
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ISSN
0867-0005
Language
pol
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