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Author
Świtalski Zbigniew
Title
Optymalny system rekrutacji kandydatów do szkół
Optimal recruitment system of candidates to schools
Source
Badania Operacyjne i Decyzje, 2005, nr 3-4, s. 85-98, bibliogr. 5 poz.
Operations Research and Decisions
Keyword
Badania operacyjne, Edukacja, Szkolnictwo państwowe, Metody numeryczne
Operations research, Education, State education, Numerical methods
Note
streszcz., summ.
Abstract
Przedstawiono uogólnienie algorytmu Gale'a-Shapleya, wyznaczającego optymalny sposób rekrutacji do szkół na przypadek, gdy preferencje szkół są określone za pomocą tzw. funkcji odrzuceń. Sformułowano warunki (addytywności, niezależności i asymetrii), przy których uogólniony algorytm G-S prowadzi do rozwiązań stabilnych i optymalnych.

We generalize a well-known Gale-Shapley algorithm concerning optimal assignment of candidates to schools. In the classical Gale-Shapley model we consider a set of schools (colleges) S, a set of candidates K, candidates' preferences in S and schools' preferences in the set K (represented by strict linear orders). We assume that each school has a quota q, i.e. q, is the maximal number of candidates which it can admit. We want to assign candidates to schools in such a way that some condition of stability (defined in [4]) is satisfied. In our generalized model schools' preferences are represented by the so-called "rejection functions". We introduce a generalized stability condition and formulate conditions under which the generalized G-S algorithm leads to stable and optimal assignments. Our results can be applied in practice, e.g., they can help in constructing computerized recruitment systems, in which we want to incorporate "soft" quotas and ties between candidates.
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
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Bibliography
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  1. ALKAN A., GALE D., Stable schedule matching under revealed preference, Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, nr 112, s. 289-306.
  2. BALINSKI M., SONMEZ T., A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement, Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, nr 84, s. 73-94.
  3. EHLERS L., Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems, Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, nr 114, s. 358-369.
  4. GALE D., SHAPLEY S., College admissions and tlie stabilny of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly. 1962, nr 69, s. 9-15.
  5. PAWŁOWSKI J., Żeby w wyniku naboru nikt nie poczuł się "nabrany". Rodzicielskie refleksje po egzaminach do szkół średnich, Informatyka w szkole - Biuletyn Informacyjny, 31(2000), (www.vulcan.edu.pl/biuletyn)
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ISSN
1230-1868
Language
pol
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