- Author
- Mitchell Janet
- Title
- Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises
- Source
- The Economics of Transition, 2000, vol. 8, nr 1, s. 59-100
- Keyword
- Budżet przedsiębiorstwa, Ekonomia polityczna, Bankowość, Modele ekonomiczne, Subwencjonowanie przedsiębiorstw, Kryzys bankowy
Budgets of enterprises, Political economy, Banking, Economic models, Enterprise subsidies, Banking crisis - Abstract
- W artykule przedstawiono nową metodę grupowania zainicjowanych przez Kornaia modeli tzw. miękkich ograniczeń budżetowych (soft budget constraints), w wyniku której wyróżniono dwie kategorie tych modeli. Rozróżnienie pozwala na stosowanie modeli w zróżnicowanych sytuacjach i ma znaczenie dla teorii ekonomii i polityki gospodarczej. Porównano zastosowania dwóch klas modeli do analizy kryzysów bankowych.
This paper proposes a new taxonomy for classifying models of soft budget constraints which allows identification of two classes of models. Distinguishing between these classes of models is useful, as they yield SBCs in differing circumstances and have differing theoretical and policy implications. The taxonomy is used to motivate an area of economic theory in which SBC models can yield novel insights: the analysis of banking crises. A model is presented in which SBCs arising from creditor passivity have implications for the question of the appropriate policy for dealing with bad debts on troubled banks' balance sheets. The paper also compares the implications of the two classes of SBC models for the analysis of banking crises. - Accessibility
- The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics - Cited by
- ISSN
- 0967-0750
- Language
- eng