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Author
Friebel Guido
Title
Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization
Source
The Economics of Transition, 2000, vol. 8, nr 1, s. 37-57
Keyword
Prywatyzacja
Privatisation
Country
Federacja Rosyjska
Russian Federation
Abstract
Artykuł opisuje przebieg procesu masowej prywatyzacji w Rosji. Zainicjowany w 1992 roku program zaowocował w krótkim czasie prywatyzacją 75 procent zasobów państwowych. Jednak rezultaty prywatyzacji są bardzo zróżnicowane w poszczególnych regionach. Artykuł stara się wyjaśnić poziom różnic w oparciu o teorię zachęty (incentive theory).

The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992-93.
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ISSN
0967-0750
Language
eng
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