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Author
Prokop Jacek (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie)
Title
Taktyki defensywne przeciwko przejęciom
Defensive Tactics against Takeovers
Source
Gospodarka Narodowa, 2002, nr 11-12, s. 17-37, bibliogr. 56 poz.
Keyword
Przejęcie przedsiębiorstwa, Fuzje i przejęcia
Corporate acquisitions, Mergers and acquisitions
Note
streszcz.
Abstract
W artykule omówiono taktyki defensywne przed przejęciami i przedstawiono wyniki badań nad skutkami ich stosowania z punktu widzenia akcjonariuszy spółek będących celem wykupu.
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
Bibliography
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ISSN
0867-0005
Language
pol
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