- Author
- Kalinowski Marcin
- Title
- Ekonomiczne przesłanki lobbingu w świetle teorii public choice
The Economic Premises of Lobbying in Light of the Public Choice Theory - Source
- Gospodarka Narodowa, 2005, nr 7-8, s. 29-44, bibliogr. 24 poz.
- Keyword
- Teoria wyboru publicznego, Świadomość ekonomiczna, Lobbing, Dobra publiczne, Proces podejmowania decyzji, Społeczeństwo, Podejmowanie decyzji
Public choice theory, Economic awareness, Lobbying, Public goods, Decision making process, Society, Decision making - Note
- summ.
- Abstract
- W artykule przedstawiono rozważania teoretyczne, dotyczące szeroko rozumianego rzecznictwa interesów. Analiza mechanizmu funkcjonowania rynku politycznego skłania do generalnego wniosku, że o ile nie sposób kwestionować centralnej roli grup nacisku w kreowaniu polityki redystrybucji i podziału środków publicznych, to już siła wpływu takich grup może podlegać kontroli społeczeństw demokratycznych.
The author analyzes the key factors that determine the effective functioning of pressure groups in democratic societies. The starting point for the research into the mechanism of the division and redistribution of public goods is the "political influence market" paradigm whereby consumers, taxpayers and organized pressure groups represent the demand side, and elected politicians and appointed officials are the supply side. The asymmetry of political information leads to a greater bargaining power of pressure groups, which secure specific economic benefits at the expense of the rest of society. Law makers tolerate lobbying because they are motivated by private political gains. The author extensively discusses the collective action model of Mancur Olson, showing the logic of group choices. The theoretical considerations presented in the article are based on the research achievements of the "school of public choice". (original abstract) - Accessibility
- The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics - Bibliography
-
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- Moe T.M., [1980], The Organization of Interests, The University of Chicago Press.
- North D.C., [1990], Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press.
- Olson M., [1971], The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press.
- Raczyński M., [1998], Pogoń za rentą a transformacja systemowa w Polsce, Ekonomista, nr 2-3, s. 211-225.
- Raczyński M., [1999], Implikacje teorii pogoni za rentą dla polityki regulacji, Gospodarka Narodowa, nr 1-2, s. 53-65.
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- Sandler T, [1992], Collective Action: Theory and Applications, University of Michigan Press.
- Taylor M., [1987], The Possibility of Cooperation, Cambridge University Press.
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- Cited by
- ISSN
- 0867-0005
- Language
- pol
