BazEkon - The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics

BazEkon home page

Main menu

Author
Kałdoński Michał, Mizerka Jacek
Title
Podatki a struktura własności
Taxes and Ownership Structure
Source
Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu, 2007, nr 1152, s. 267-277, tab., rys., bibliogr. 11 poz.
Issue title
Zarządzanie finansami firm : teoria i praktyka
Keyword
Podatki, Wartość przedsiębiorstwa, Struktura własnościowa przedsiębiorstw
Taxes, Enterprise value, Ownership structure of enterprises
Note
summ.
Abstract
Decyzja o wyborze formy organizacyjno-prawne jest wynikiem uwzględnienia wielu, często przeciwstawnie oddziałujących, czynników. Ostatecznym kryterium wyboru jest jednak kryterium wartości firmy. Przedstawiono determinanty oraz propozycję dynamicznego modelu wyboru organizacyjno-prawnej formy przedsiębiorstwa.

The paper concerns the problem of choosing an organizational and legal form for the firm. The structure of ownership is reflected in the organizational and legal form of running the firm. The authors focus on two extreme forms: sole proprietorship and Corporation. The proposed model of choosing an organizational form is a development of the concept of MacKie-Mason and Gordon. The authors confront an excess of benefits from risk diversification over agency costs with differences in taxation. For the purpose of choosing an organizational form, the authors use the model of valuing an option to switch proposed by Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
Full text
Show
Bibliography
Show
  1. Bernanke B., Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Cyclical Investment, "The Quarterly Journal of Economics"1983, nr 98.
  2. Fama E.F, Contract Costs and Financing Decisions, "Journal of Business" 1990, nr 63.
  3. Fama E.F., Jensen M.C., Separation of Ownership and Control, "Journal of Law and Economics" 1983(a), nr 26.
  4. Fama E.F., Jensen M.C., Agency Problems and Residual Claims, "Journal of Law and Economics", 1983(b),nr 26.
  5. Göcke M., Various Concepts of Hysteresis Applied in Economics, "Journal of Economic Surveys" 2002, nr 2.
  6. Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, "Journal of Financial Economics" 1976, nr 3.
  7. Kulatilaka N., Trigeorgis L., The General Flexibility to Switch: Real Options Revisited, [w:] Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty, ed. E.S. Schwartz, L. Trigeorgis, MIT Press, Cambridge 2001.
  8. Lichtarski J. (red.), Podstawy nauki o przedsiębiorstwie, AE, Wrocław 2003.
  9. MacKie-Mason J.K., Gordon R.H., How Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?, "Journal of Finance" 1997, nr 2.
  10. Myers D., Smith C.W., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, "Journal of Business" 1982, nr 55.
  11. Scholes M.S., Wolfson M.A., Taxes and Organization Theory, Referat prezentowany na Yale Conferenceon Economics of Organization 1986.
Cited by
Show
ISSN
0324-8445
Language
pol
Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Share on Google+ Share on Pinterest Share on LinkedIn Wyślij znajomemu