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Author
Rogoda Bogdan (Wydział Ekonomii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych)
Title
Ceny optymalne a zmiany stawek podatku VAT w warunkach konkurencji
Optimum Prices from Changes in VAT Rates in Competition Conditions
Source
Zeszyty Naukowe / Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, 2008, nr 769, s. 81-91, bibliogr. 4 poz.
Keyword
Ceny, Optymalizacja decyzji, Konkurencja, Podatek obrotowy, Teoria gier
Prices, Decision optimization, Competition, Business tax, Game theory
Note
summ.
Abstract
Podjęto próbę ustalenia właściwych strategii cenowych przedsiębiorstwa. Określono jak powinna zmieniać się cena sprzedaży po zmianie stawki VAT. Do przeprowadzonej analizy wykorzystano teorię gier, która pozwoliła ustalić optymalna decyzję cenową firmy z uwagi na cel, jakim jest maksymalizacja zysku.

An indirect tax, VAT is by definition not neutral in relation to prices, since it is added on to net prices by the seller, thus increasing the price paid by the customer. When a change in VAT rates occurs or VAT is imposed on goods that were previously exempt, a company has to make a decision concerning price strategy. The company can maintain the gross price and itself absorb the tax burden or add the tax to the price (an increase in gross price) with the aim of shifting the tax burden onto the consumer. In a competitive consumer goods market, i.e., when the price decisions of competitors have a mutual impact on the size of sales and profits, optimum prices are rigid relative to VAT. In light of game theory, the winning strategy is to leave the gross price at an unchanged level and accept a lower net price. This enables a smaller reduction in profit, if competitors also apply this strategy, or even an increase in profit, if competitors decide to increase the gross price. The use of a cartel agreement with the aim of increasing prices by the rate of VAT causes a greater losses of profit than if the previous prices are collectively maintained. Where there is competition and elastic demand, attempts to shift the VAT burden onto consumers are ineffective, as some clients will be lost and there will be a greater burden on those remaining. Compensation for loss of profit can only be sought in winning inter-branch competition or through the growth in income of consumers and profitable expansion of demand. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
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Bibliography
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  1. Laidler D., Estrin S., Wstęp do mikroekonomii, Gebethner i Ska, Warszawa 1991.
  2. Rogoda B., Polityka cenowa małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw, Oficyna Ekonomiczna, Kraków 2004.
  3. Sasin W., Sasin P., Podatek od towarów i usług VAT na nowych zasadach od l maja 2004 r., Wydawnictwo „Sigma”, Skierniewice 2004.
  4. Simon H., Zarządzanie cenami, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1996.
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ISSN
1898-6447
Language
pol
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