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Author
Chessa Michela (Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy), Fragnelli Vito (University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy)
Title
Quantitative Evaluation of Veto Power
Source
Operations Research and Decisions, 2011, vol. 21, no. 3-4, s. 5-19, rys., tab., bibliogr. 21 poz.
Keyword
Polityka, Modele bayesowskie, Podejmowanie decyzji
Politics, Bayesian models, Decision making
Note
summ.
Abstract
The decisiveness index and the loose protectionism index for a single player have been introduced, starting from the decisiveness and the loose protectionism indices for a collective decisionmaking mechanism defined by Carreras. Attention was mainly focused on the latter index, being proposed as a quantitative measure of the power of veto of each agent. According to this index, a veto player has veto power equal to one, while each other player has a fractional power according to her/his likelihood of blocking a given proposal. Such an index coincides with the expected payoff at the Bayesian equilibrium of a suitable Bayesian game, which illustrates the non-cooperative point of view of a decision-making mechanism. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
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The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
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Bibliography
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ISSN
2081-8858
Language
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.5277/ord1203-0401
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