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Author
Takács István (Károly Robert College, Hungary)
Title
Games of Farmers - To Cooperate or Not?
Gry rolników - współpracować czy nie?
Source
Roczniki Naukowe Stowarzyszenia Ekonomistów Rolnictwa i Agrobiznesu, 2012, T. 14, z. 6, s. 260-266, rys., tab., bibliogr. 17 poz.
Keyword
Modele symulacyjne, Rolnictwo, Współpraca, Teoria gier
Simulation models, Agriculture, Cooperation, Game theory
Note
streszcz., summ.
Country
Węgry
Hungary
Abstract
Oznaki kryzysu węgierskiego rolnictwa wynikają głównie z przyjętego modelu społecznego i gospodarczego, który w ostatnich dwóch dekadach został "zamrożony". Mimo to ewoluowała struktura gospodarstw rolnych, zrestrukturyzowano powiązania społeczno-gospodarcze wśród rolników, szczególnie w zakresie wzajemnej współpracy. Ze względu na niejednakowy dostęp rolników do informacji i brak zaufania w działaniach kooperacyjnych stwierdzono, iż wydatki w gospodarstwach indywidualnych i uspołecznionych są wyższe niż byłoby to ekonomicznie uzasadnione. Opierając się na modelu symulacyjnym podjęto próbę oceny wynagrodzenia dla indywidualnych i uspołecznionych gospodarstw pod kątem wykorzystania parku maszynowego i wdrażanych strategii inwestycyjnych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Signs of the crisis of the Hungarian agriculture are in relation with the economic and social model that has become rigid throughout the past two decades. The evolved structure of agricultural holdings the networks among the farmers have been restructured as well as have become losen. The degree of trust has decreased. Based on the principles of the modem economic schools, e.g. the game theory, the study examines how the existing trust level among fanners affects the farmers' preferences of choice among the different forms of dependencies, as well as which factors affect the individual utility functions, focused on the role of subsidies from the social transaction costs. Due to the information asymmetry between farmers and the lack of confidence, the individual and the social expenditures are higher than economically justifable. Based on a simulation model the paper examines the payoffs of the farms as well as the community from the point of view of machinery use and investment strategies. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
Bibliography
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  2. Axelrod R. 1984: The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. 241 p.
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  14. Takács I. 2003: Changing of some technical asset efficiency indexes on Hungarian farms. Annals of the Polish Association of Agricultural and Agribusiness Economists, vol. V, no. 6, 101-105.
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Cited by
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ISSN
1508-3535
Language
eng
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