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Author
Stradomski Maciej (Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu)
Title
Kontrakt dłużny w świetle teorii kontraktowej
The Analysis of Debt Contract from the Point of View of the Contract Theory
Source
Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia, 2010, nr 29, s. 165-177, rys., tab., bibliogr. 19 poz.
Keyword
Teoria ekonomii, Teoria kontraktów, Instrumenty dłużne
Economic theory, Contract theory, Debt instrument
Note
streszcz., summ..
Abstract
Badania na temat projektowania instrumentów finansowych (kontraktów finansowych) rozpoczęły się zasadniczo wraz z publikacją przełomowych prac F. Modiglianiego i M. Millera. Nie oznacza to, iż wcześniej ich nie prowadzono. Problematyka projektowania instrumentów finansowych wywodzi się bowiem z szerokiego nurtu badań z zakresu teorii kontraktowej, teorii niedoskonałości rynkowych oraz teorii firmy. Dzisiejsze rozważania nad kształtem kontraktów finansowych byłyby niemożliwe bez prac J. Neumanna i O. Morgensterna (analiza zachowań w warunkach niepewności), T. Marschaka i K. Arrowa (teoria agencji), O. Williamsona (teoria kosztów transakcji), M. Rothschilda i J. Stiglitza (teoria asymetrii informacyjnej), H. Simona i O.D. Harta (teoria praw własności) oraz wielu innych badaczy. U samych podstaw badań nad rolą i kształtem kontraktów finansowych leżą również prace A. Smitha, D. Hume'a, L. Walrasa, i L. Hurwicza z zakresu teorii bodźców i jej zastosowania w naukach społecznych i ekonomicznych. (fragment tekstu)

The contract theory developed in recent years gives us new grounds for optimizing the content of debt contracts signed by companies on the capital market. The structuring of a debt contract may be based on the idea of an optimal contract, which would result in an appropriate allocation of rights and obligations of the parties in all identified nature States. An optimal debt contract must, above all, specify the distribution of rights in case of project failure, as well as guarantee that the companies are safeguarded against a suboptimal liquidation conducted by the creditor. The provisions of a debt contract should not only result from the financial condition of the debtor, but should also correspond to the level of protection of rights characteristic for a given economy. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
Szczecin University Main Library
Bibliography
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ISSN
1640-6818
1733-2842
Language
pol
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