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Author
Słomka-Gołębiowska Agnieszka (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie), Krystiańczuk Kinga (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, doktorantka)
Title
Głosowanie na walnych zgromadzeniach akcjonariuszy jako instrument ładu korporacyjnego w rękach OFE : analiza przypadku Aviva OFE
Pension Funds and Corporate Governance: The Case Study of Aviva OFE
Source
Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne, 2014, t. 91, cz.2, s. 361-376, wykr., tab., bibliogr. 11 poz.
Studies in Law and Economics
Keyword
Głosowanie, Ład korporacyjny, Emerytury, Fundusze emerytalne, Akcjonariusz, Inwestor instytucjonalny
Voting, Corporate governance, Pensions, Pension funds, Shareholders, Institutional investors
Note
summ.
Company
Aviva OFE
Abstract
Celem niniejszego opracowania jest sprawdzenie, czy fundusze emerytalne w Polsce angażują się w aktywny nadzór nad spółkami portfelowymi, korzystając z prawa głosu na walnych zgromadzeniach. Opracowanie, poprzedzone wstępem, rozpoczęto omówieniem wyników dotychczasowych badań empirycznych, traktujących udział w głosowaniu na walnym zgromadzeniu akcjonariuszy jako mechanizm ładu korporacyjnego. W punkcie trzecim zaprezentowano najważniejsze hipotezy badawcze oraz opisano metodę badania i próbę badawczą. Rezultaty analiz oraz dyskusja nad nimi zawarte są w czwartym punkcie. Opracowanie zakończono podsumowaniem. (fragment tekstu)

The purpose of this study is to examine whether pension funds in Poland, as a significant shareholder of listed companies, usually a minority, engage in corporate governance using the right to vote at general meetings. In particular, it examines whether pension funds refrain from voting or voted against the resolutions on matters which violate their rights of minority shareholders. Also, the study makes an attempt to assess whether the recent legal changes have altered the nature of the pension funds' voting behavior. The analysis is based on data from the reports on general meetings of portfolio companies published by Aviva OFE for 2007 and for 2012, when the fund took the vote on the 980 and the 1822 respectively. The research results show that Aviva OFE was involved in corporate governance through voting at the general meeting being against resolutions, which clearly violated the interests of the shareholder, such as related to the executive remuneration and property issues. It is interesting that in most cases the fund voted with management on personnel matters or financial matters such as distribution of profit or coverage starts, even though their Corporate Governance Standards declare their willingness to participate effectively in the nomination and appointment of supervisory boards members. There was almost none of the resolutions relating to transactions with related parties, which may indicate a violation of the rights of minority shareholders, who should be able to express an opinion on this subject especially in highly concentrated ownership structure of listed companies in Poland. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
Bibliography
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  1. Arx U. von, Schafer A., The Influence of Pension Funds on Corporate Governance, CER-ETH Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich 2007/7/63.
  2. Becht M., Franks J., Mayer C., Rossi S., Returns to Shareholder Activism Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund, ECGI - Finance Working Paper 2006.
  3. Bethel J., Gillian S., The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, Financial Management 2002/31(4).
  4. Choi S.J., Fisch J.E., On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, Vanderbilt Law Review 2008.
  5. Cziraki P., Renneboog L., Szilagyi P., Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective, European Financial Management 2010/16/5.
  6. Del Guerio D., Hawkins J., The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, Journal of Financial Economics 1998/52.
  7. Gillan S., Starks L., Institutional investors, corporate ownership, and corporate governance: global perspectives, UNU, World Institute for Development Economics, Helsinki 2002.
  8. Mallin Ch., Institutional and Other Shareholders, [w:] Baker K., Anderson R., Corporate governance. A Synyhesis of Theory, Research, and Practice, Kolb Series in Finance, Wiley 2010.
  9. Nelson J., The CalPERS Effect Revisited Again, Journal of Corporate Finance 2006/12.
  10. Smith M., Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, Journal of Finance 1996/51.
  11. Wahal S., Public Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, Arizona State University, Arizona 2007.
Cited by
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ISSN
0081-6841
Language
pol
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