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Kecskés András (University of Pécs, Hungary), Halász Vendel (University of Pécs, Hungary)
Performance Based Compensation : a Practical Guidance on Remuneration of Corporate Executives
Wynagrodzenie zależne od efektów : praktyczne aspekty wynagradzania osób zarządzających spółkami kapitałowymi
Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne, 2014, t. 92, s. 69-90, bibliogr. 18 poz.
Studies in Law and Economics
Spółki kapitałowe, Kadra kierownicza, Efektywność
Capital company, Managerial staff, Effectiveness
W ostatnich dziesięcioleciach nastąpiły istotne zmiany w zakresie wynagrodzeń osób zarządzających firmami. Nie tylko tendencja wzrostu tych wynagrodzeń, lecz także znaczące przejście w kierunku uwzględniania czynników opartych na wyniku i (szczególnie) wartości rynkowej firmy, sprawiły, że zjawisko to zwróciło uwagę prawników i ekonomistów. W artykule tym autorzy, w oparciu o obowiązujące regulacje prawne, chcieliby rzucić światło na praktyczne aspekty określania wysokości uposażeń osób zarządzających korporacjami. (abstrakt oryginalny)

There are two basic tools of motivating executives, to run the corporation on behalf of shareholders. On one hand, it can be a financial motivation, on the other hand, career orientation. The basis of monetary incentives can be either accounting profitability, or the performance of shares, which is their price on the stock market. Investors holding a diversified portfolio look for a CEO that acts in a way that the owner, or at least like an equity partner would. If we want such a CEO, it is necessary to grant him a suitable part of the equity. Nonetheless it is possible that the CEO is the one, who is the most interested in the company's fate, as a diversified investor pays less attention to the operation of individual companies, and cares more about its own portfolio. From a theoretical perspective, executive remuneration is defined by the following criteria: the management's attitude towards risks; the management's motivation in the light of remuneration; and those pieces of information, by which the performance of the manager can be assessed through the performance indices of the company. (fragment of text)
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