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Author
Nogalski Bogdan (Uniwersytet Gdański), Szymański Marek (Wyższa Szkoła Administracji i Biznesu im. E. Kwiatkowskiego w Gdyni)
Title
Między Scyllą agresji i Charybdą obrony : wrogie przejęcia jako sytuacje kryzysowe
Between the Scylla of Aggression and the Charybdis of Defense : Hostile Takeovers as Crisis Situations
Source
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, 2010, nr 116, s. 287-297, bibliogr. 34 poz.
Research Papers of Wrocław University of Economics
Issue title
Zarządzanie strategiczne w praktyce i teorii
Keyword
Wrogie przejęcie, Akcjonariusz, Interesariusze, Spółki publiczne
Hostile takeover, Shareholders, Stakeholders, Public companies
Note
streszcz., summ.
Abstract
Praktyczne podejście do dopuszczalności obrony przed wrogim przejęciem powinno uwzględniać ocenę poszczególnych działań, ich motywów i sytuacji, w jakiej zostały podjęte. Wydaje się, że twarde reguły określające ogólne zasady działania kierownictwa w sytuacji zagrożenia wrogim przejęciem byłyby niepożądane. Nawet ustalenie precyzyjnych parametrów zachowań kierownictwa spółki przejmowanej w określonej sytuacji może rodzić poważne wątpliwości. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Hostile takeovers arouse controversies. So-called managerialists camp sees hostile actions against public companies as threats for companies themselves and their stakeholders. Another view is represented by shareholders choice camp. In this view hostile takeovers are the simple way to replace ineffective managements. Both camps wrestle using several normative perspectives and several arguments. This article summarizes the debate between them. (original abstract)
Accessibility
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The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
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Bibliography
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ISSN
1899-3192
Language
pol
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