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Author
Bertini Cesarino (University of Bergamo, Italy), Gambrelli Gianfranco (University of Bergamo, Italy), Stach Izabella (AGH University of Science and Technology Kraków, Poland)
Title
Some Open Problems in Cooperative Games
Wybrane problemy otwarte teorii gier kooperacyjnych
Source
Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia, 2015, nr 74 T.1, s. 469-479, bibliogr. 42 poz.
Issue title
Rynek kapitałowy, wycena przedsiębiorstw, inwestycje
Keyword
Indeks siły, Gry kooperacyjne, Finanse, Polityka
Power index, Cooperative game, Finance, Politics
Note
streszcz., summ..
Abstract
W artykule zostały zaprezentowane niektóre problemy, wciąż otwarte, dotyczące teorii i zastosowania gier kooperacyjnych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

In this paper we highlight some problems, still open before us, concerning the theory and application of cooperative games. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of Poznań University of Economics and Business
Szczecin University Main Library
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Bibliography
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ISSN
1640-6818
1733-2842
Language
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/frfu.2015.74/1-40
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