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Author
Swistak Piotr (University of Maryland, USA)
Title
Some Problems with Judging Rationality
Pewne problemy z oceną racjonalności
Source
Decyzje, 2015, nr 23, s. 5-22, tab., bibliogr. 16 poz.
Keyword
Gra Ultimatum, Teoria wyboru, Racjonalność, Teoria gier
Ultimatum game, Choice theory, Rationality, Game theory
Note
summ., streszcz.
Abstract
Różnica między predykcjami wynikającymi z teorii gier a rzeczywistymi wyborami dokonywanymi przez uczestników eksperymentów jest nadinterpretowana jako dowód na nieracjonalność graczy. W pracy rozważam pewną wersję gry ultimatum i badam jej równowagi przy różnych założeniach o preferencjach uczestników. Korzystając ze standardowego pojęcia racjonalności wykazuję, że rozbieżność między wynikiem "normatywnym" i "deskryptywnym" nie może być ustalana poprzez proste porównanie punktów równowagi gry z rzeczywistymi wyborami dokonywanymi przez ludzi. (abstrakt oryginalny)

The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players' preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the "normative" and the "descriptive" cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
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Bibliography
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Cited by
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ISSN
1733-0092
Language
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.44
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