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Paszewski Tomasz (Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN w Warszawie)
The Credibility of NATO Security Guarantees from the Polish Perspective
Wiarygodność natowskich gwarancji bezpieczeństwa z perspektywy Polski
Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna, 2016, nr 3 (54), s. 269-291, rys., tab., bibliogr. s. 286-290
Bezpieczeństwo, Budżet obronny
Security, Military budget
streszcz., summ., rez.
Organizacja Paktu Północnego Atlantyku
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Artykuł wyróżnia ryzyka dla wiarygodności i skuteczności NATO jako organizacji kolektywnej obrony w perspektywie krótko- i średnio-terminowej, zaliczając do nich napięte budżety obronne w kluczowych państwach NATO, koncentracji dużej części członków NATO na innych zagrożeniach niż tych związanych z art. 5, ograniczenie amerykańskiego zaangażowania w europejskie bezpieczeństwo związane z permanentnie nierównym podziałem kosztów w NATO oraz zmiany na szczytach władzy w państwach sojuszu, które mogą podważyć transatlantycką solidarność w sferze bezpieczeństwa. Odwołując się do teorii sojuszów i teorii odstraszania tekst stawia tezę, że wiarygodność sojuszniczych gwarancji jest zawsze ograniczona, a także podlega istotnym fluktuacjom w czasie. (abstrakt oryginalny)

The article distinguishes such risks for the credibility and effectiveness of NATO as a collective defence organisation in the short and medium term perspective, as tight defence budgets in key NATO countries, concentration of a large part of the members of NATO on other risks than those associated with Art. 5, the reduction of US involvement in European security connected with permanently unequal distribution of costs in NATO and changes in power in alliance countries that may undermine the transatlantic solidarity in the field of security. Referring to the theory of alliances and theories of deterrence the text argues that the credibility of alliance guarantee is always limited and is subject to significant fluctuations over time. (original abstract)
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