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Author
Tokarski Zbigniew (Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu - National-Louis University w Nowym Sączu)
Title
Wybrane modele oligopolu i kartelu
Selected Oligopoly and Cartel Models
Source
Organizacje Komercyjne i Niekomercyjne wobec Wzmożonej Konkurencji i Rosnących Wymagań Konsumentów, 2010, vol. 9, s. 83-93, tab., bibliogr. 17 poz.
Keyword
Kartel, Oligopole, Teoria zachowań
Cartel, Oligopolies, Behaviour theory
Note
summ.
Abstract
W artykule przedstawione zostaną wspomniane modele i podstawowe różnice między nimi. W każdym z tych modeli firmy starają się zmaksymalizować swój zysk, jednak zamierzają to osiągnąć przy pomocy różnych środków. (fragment tekstu)

According to a definition an oligopoly is a market form in which a market or industry is dominated by a small number of sellers (which are called oligopolists). The decisions of one firm influence, and are at the same time influenced by, the decisions of other firms. In some situations, the firms may employ restrictive trade practices to raise prices and restrict production, this is known as cartel. There are many models describing the operation of an oligopolistic market. In this article the author wants to concentrate on describing and comparing series of simplified models based on classical economics (Stackelberg model, Cournot-Nash model, Bertrand model) as well as a game theory. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics
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Bibliography
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