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Świtalski Zbigniew (University of Zielona Góra)
Stability and Price Equilibria in a Many-to-Many Gale-Shapley Market Model
Stabilność i równowagi cenowe w modelu rynku Gale'a-Shapleya typu "many-to-many"
Przegląd Statystyczny, 2017, vol. 64, z. 3, s. 229-248, bibliogr. s. 246-247
Statistical Review
Konkurencja cenowa, Matematyczne modele ekonomiczne, Ekonomia matematyczna, Równowaga rynkowa
Price competition, Mathematical economic models, Mathematical economics, Market equilibrium
streszcz., summ.
W artykule zbadano zależności między uogólnionymi równowagami konkurencyjnymi zdefiniowanymi w pracy Świtalskiego (2016), a równowagami cenowymi dla pewnego wariantu modelu rynku Gale'a-Shapleya (typu "many-to-many"), a także między równowagami cenowymi a skojarzeniami stabilnymi dla tego modelu. Uzyskane wyniki wykorzystano do udowodnienia twierdzeń o istnieniu równowag cenowych w modelu GS typu many-to-many oraz w pewnym modelu typu many-to-many uogólniającym model zawarty w pracy Chen i inni (2014). (abstrakt oryginalny)

In the paper we study relationships between generalized competitive equilibria defined in the paper of Świtalski (2016) and price equilibria for some variant of many-to-many market model of GaleShapley type and between price equilibria and stable matchings for such a model. Obtained results are used for proving theorems on existence of price equilibria in the many-to-many GS-model and in the many-to-many model generalizing the model of Chen, Deng and Ghosh (Chen et al., 2014). (original abstract)
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