BazEkon - The Main Library of the Cracow University of Economics

BazEkon home page

Main menu

Author
Wielechowski Michał (Warsaw University of Life Sciences - SGGW, Poland)
Title
Political Budget Cycles in the European Union - Post-Communist Heritage
Zjawisko politycznego cyklu budżetowego w Unii Europejskiej - postkomunistyczna spuścizna
Source
Acta Scientiarum Polonorum. Oeconomia, 2018, R. 17, nr 2, s. 125-132, tab., bibliogr. 35 poz.
Keyword
Kraje postkomunistyczne, Manipulacja społeczna, Polityka fiskalna
Post-communist countries, Social manipulation, Fiscal policy
Note
streszcz., summ.
Company
Unia Europejska (UE)
European Union (EU)
Abstract
Celem artykułu jest weryfikacja hipotezy traktującej o wpływie postkomunistycznej spuścizny na występowanie zjawiska politycznego cyklu budżetowego w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. Wykazano, że w państwach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, w których panował ustrój komunistyczny po II wojnie światowej, przedwyborcza manipulacja fiskalna prowadziła do wzrostu wydatków sektora instytucji rządowych i samorządowych ogółem per capita o 1,9%. Ponadto w tej grupie państw UE stwierdzono występowanie istotnego wzrostu wydatków publicznych związanych z działalnością ogólnopaństwową, bezpieczeństwem i porządkiem publicznym oraz sprawami gospodarczymi. W pozostałych państwach członkowskich UE nie stwierdzono zaś istotnych zmian poziomu wydatków publicznych ogółem oraz poszczególnych kategorii wydatków sektora instytucji rządowych i samorządowych w okresie przedwyborczym, z wyjątkiem związanych z ochroną środowiska. Wyniki wskazały na występowanie heterogeniczności politycznych cyklów budżetowych w UE w zależności od historii ustroju politycznego. (abstrakt oryginalny)

We test the hypothesis that post-communist history affect election cycles in the European Union countries. We show that pre-election fiscal manipulation increase total public spending per capita by 1.9% and three specific spending categories, i.e. general public services, public order and safety, and economic affairs in Central and Eastern Europe democracies with post-communist roots. At the same time we observe no significant spending deviations in remaining EU Member States, except expenditure linked to environmental protection. Our results indicate cross-country heterogeneity of political budget cycles (PBCs) in the EU, conditional on political system history. (original abstract)
Accessibility
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
Full text
Show
Bibliography
Show
  1. Ademmer, E., Dreher, F. (2016). Institutional Constraints to Political Budget Cycles in the Enlarged EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54 (3), 508-524. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12306
  2. Aidt, T.S., Veiga, F.J., Veiga, L.G. (2011). Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model. Public Choice, 148 (1-2), 21-44. DOI: 10.17863/CAM.5626
  3. Akhmedov, A., Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young democracy setting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1301-1338. DOI: 10.2139/ ssrn.396240
  4. Arvate, P., Avelino Filho, G., Tavares, J. (2009). Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: "Sophisticated" versus "naïve" voters. Economics Letters, 102 (2), 125-127, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.030
  5. Block, S.A. (2002). Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 67, 205-228. DOI: 10.1016/ S0304-3878(01)00184-5
  6. Brender, A. (2003). The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989-1998. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2187-2205. DOI: 10.1016/ S0047-2727(02)00045-2
  7. Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1271-1295
  8. Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2008). How do budget deficits and economic performance affect reelection prospects? American Economic Review, 98 (5), 2203-2220. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.2203
  9. Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2013). Elections, leaders, and the composition of government spending. Journal of Public Economics, 97 (1), 18-31. DOI: 10.1016/ j.jpubeco.2012.08.011
  10. Buti, M., Van den Noord, P. (2004). Fiscal discretion and elections in the early years of EMU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 43, 737-756. DOI: 10.1111/j.0021- 9886.2004.00527.x
  11. De Haan, J. (2014). Democracy, Elections and Government Budget Deficit. German Economic Review, 15 (1), 131- -142, DOI: 10.1111/geer.12022
  12. De Haan, J., Klomp, J. (2013). Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence. Public Choice, 157, 387-410. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0106-6
  13. Dolezalova, J. (2013). Political cycle and fiscal policy in the countries of the European Union. Central European Review of Economic Issues, 16, 93-108. DOI: 10.7327/ cerei.2013.06.04
  14. Drazen, A., Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92, 39-52. DOI: 10.1016/ j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
  15. Dubois, E. (2016). Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus. Public Choice, 166, 235-259. DOI: 10.1007/ s11127-016-0313-z
  16. Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures. Public Choice, 153, 295-327. DOI: 10.1007/s 11127-011- 9795-x
  17. Enkelmann, S., Leibrecht, M. (2013). Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions. Economics Letters, 121, 128-132. DOI: 10.1016/ j.econlet.2013.07.015
  18. Franzese, R. (2000). Electoral and partisan manipulation of public debt in developed democracies, 1956-1990. [In:] R. Strauch, J. Von Hagen (Eds.), Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 61-83.
  19. Garmann, S. (2017). Political budget cycles and fiscally conservative voters. Economics Letters, 155, 72-75, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.023
  20. Katsimi, M., Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice, 151, 325-362. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8
  21. Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013a). Political budget cycles and election outcomes. Public Choice, 157, 245-267. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9943-y
  22. Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013b). Do political budget cycles really exist? Applied Economics, 45 (3), 329-341. DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.599787
  23. Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013c). Popular protest and political budget cycles: A panel data analysis. Economics Letters, 120, 516-520. Applied Economics, 45 (3), 329-341. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9943-y
  24. Mink, M., De Haan, J. (2006). Are there political budget cycles in the euro area? European Union Politics, 7, 191-211. DOI: 10.1177/1465116506063706
  25. Nannestad, P., Paldam M. (1994). The VP-function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years. Public Choice, 79, 213-245. DOI: 10.1007/BF01047771
  26. Nordhaus, W.D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42 (2), 169-190.
  27. Peltzman, S. (1992). Voters as fiscal conservatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 325-345, DOI: 10.2307/2118475.
  28. Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. The American Economic Review, 80, 21-36. Sakurai, S., Menezes-Filho, N. (2008). Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities. Public Choice, 137, 301-314, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9329-3.
  29. Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries. Public Choice, 102, 115-130. DOI: 10.1023/A:1005026806998
  30. Shi, M., Svensson, J. (2002). Conditional political budget cycles. CEPR, Discussion Paper 3352.
  31. Shi, M., Svensson, J. (2003). Political Budget Cycles: A Review of recent Developments. Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29, 67-76.
  32. Shi, M., Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1367-1389. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009
  33. Stanova, N. (2012). Democratic learning and fiscal rules in the political budget cycles of the CEE countries. International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies, 5 (2), 168-182. DOI: 10.1504/IJEPEE.2012.048501
  34. Tujula, M., Wolswijk, G. (2007). Budget balances in OECD countries: what makes them change? Empirica, 34, 1-14. DOI: 10.1007/s10663-006-9015-y
  35. Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25 (1), 63-77.
Cited by
Show
ISSN
1644-0757
Language
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/ASPE.2018.17.2.28
Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Share on Google+ Share on Pinterest Share on LinkedIn Wyślij znajomemu