- Author
- Wielechowski Michał (Warsaw University of Life Sciences - SGGW, Poland)
- Title
- Political Budget Cycles in the European Union - Post-Communist Heritage
Zjawisko politycznego cyklu budżetowego w Unii Europejskiej - postkomunistyczna spuścizna - Source
- Acta Scientiarum Polonorum. Oeconomia, 2018, R. 17, nr 2, s. 125-132, tab., bibliogr. 35 poz.
- Keyword
- Kraje postkomunistyczne, Manipulacja społeczna, Polityka fiskalna
Post-communist countries, Social manipulation, Fiscal policy - Note
- streszcz., summ.
- Company
- Unia Europejska (UE)
European Union (EU) - Abstract
- Celem artykułu jest weryfikacja hipotezy traktującej o wpływie postkomunistycznej spuścizny na występowanie zjawiska politycznego cyklu budżetowego w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. Wykazano, że w państwach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, w których panował ustrój komunistyczny po II wojnie światowej, przedwyborcza manipulacja fiskalna prowadziła do wzrostu wydatków sektora instytucji rządowych i samorządowych ogółem per capita o 1,9%. Ponadto w tej grupie państw UE stwierdzono występowanie istotnego wzrostu wydatków publicznych związanych z działalnością ogólnopaństwową, bezpieczeństwem i porządkiem publicznym oraz sprawami gospodarczymi. W pozostałych państwach członkowskich UE nie stwierdzono zaś istotnych zmian poziomu wydatków publicznych ogółem oraz poszczególnych kategorii wydatków sektora instytucji rządowych i samorządowych w okresie przedwyborczym, z wyjątkiem związanych z ochroną środowiska. Wyniki wskazały na występowanie heterogeniczności politycznych cyklów budżetowych w UE w zależności od historii ustroju politycznego. (abstrakt oryginalny)
We test the hypothesis that post-communist history affect election cycles in the European Union countries. We show that pre-election fiscal manipulation increase total public spending per capita by 1.9% and three specific spending categories, i.e. general public services, public order and safety, and economic affairs in Central and Eastern Europe democracies with post-communist roots. At the same time we observe no significant spending deviations in remaining EU Member States, except expenditure linked to environmental protection. Our results indicate cross-country heterogeneity of political budget cycles (PBCs) in the EU, conditional on political system history. (original abstract) - Accessibility
- The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice - Full text
- Show
- Bibliography
- Ademmer, E., Dreher, F. (2016). Institutional Constraints to Political Budget Cycles in the Enlarged EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54 (3), 508-524. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12306
- Aidt, T.S., Veiga, F.J., Veiga, L.G. (2011). Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model. Public Choice, 148 (1-2), 21-44. DOI: 10.17863/CAM.5626
- Akhmedov, A., Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young democracy setting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1301-1338. DOI: 10.2139/ ssrn.396240
- Arvate, P., Avelino Filho, G., Tavares, J. (2009). Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: "Sophisticated" versus "naïve" voters. Economics Letters, 102 (2), 125-127, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.030
- Block, S.A. (2002). Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 67, 205-228. DOI: 10.1016/ S0304-3878(01)00184-5
- Brender, A. (2003). The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989-1998. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2187-2205. DOI: 10.1016/ S0047-2727(02)00045-2
- Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1271-1295
- Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2008). How do budget deficits and economic performance affect reelection prospects? American Economic Review, 98 (5), 2203-2220. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.2203
- Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2013). Elections, leaders, and the composition of government spending. Journal of Public Economics, 97 (1), 18-31. DOI: 10.1016/ j.jpubeco.2012.08.011
- Buti, M., Van den Noord, P. (2004). Fiscal discretion and elections in the early years of EMU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 43, 737-756. DOI: 10.1111/j.0021- 9886.2004.00527.x
- De Haan, J. (2014). Democracy, Elections and Government Budget Deficit. German Economic Review, 15 (1), 131- -142, DOI: 10.1111/geer.12022
- De Haan, J., Klomp, J. (2013). Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence. Public Choice, 157, 387-410. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0106-6
- Dolezalova, J. (2013). Political cycle and fiscal policy in the countries of the European Union. Central European Review of Economic Issues, 16, 93-108. DOI: 10.7327/ cerei.2013.06.04
- Drazen, A., Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92, 39-52. DOI: 10.1016/ j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
- Dubois, E. (2016). Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus. Public Choice, 166, 235-259. DOI: 10.1007/ s11127-016-0313-z
- Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures. Public Choice, 153, 295-327. DOI: 10.1007/s 11127-011- 9795-x
- Enkelmann, S., Leibrecht, M. (2013). Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions. Economics Letters, 121, 128-132. DOI: 10.1016/ j.econlet.2013.07.015
- Franzese, R. (2000). Electoral and partisan manipulation of public debt in developed democracies, 1956-1990. [In:] R. Strauch, J. Von Hagen (Eds.), Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 61-83.
- Garmann, S. (2017). Political budget cycles and fiscally conservative voters. Economics Letters, 155, 72-75, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.023
- Katsimi, M., Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice, 151, 325-362. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8
- Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013a). Political budget cycles and election outcomes. Public Choice, 157, 245-267. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9943-y
- Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013b). Do political budget cycles really exist? Applied Economics, 45 (3), 329-341. DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.599787
- Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013c). Popular protest and political budget cycles: A panel data analysis. Economics Letters, 120, 516-520. Applied Economics, 45 (3), 329-341. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9943-y
- Mink, M., De Haan, J. (2006). Are there political budget cycles in the euro area? European Union Politics, 7, 191-211. DOI: 10.1177/1465116506063706
- Nannestad, P., Paldam M. (1994). The VP-function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years. Public Choice, 79, 213-245. DOI: 10.1007/BF01047771
- Nordhaus, W.D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42 (2), 169-190.
- Peltzman, S. (1992). Voters as fiscal conservatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 325-345, DOI: 10.2307/2118475.
- Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. The American Economic Review, 80, 21-36. Sakurai, S., Menezes-Filho, N. (2008). Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities. Public Choice, 137, 301-314, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9329-3.
- Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries. Public Choice, 102, 115-130. DOI: 10.1023/A:1005026806998
- Shi, M., Svensson, J. (2002). Conditional political budget cycles. CEPR, Discussion Paper 3352.
- Shi, M., Svensson, J. (2003). Political Budget Cycles: A Review of recent Developments. Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29, 67-76.
- Shi, M., Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1367-1389. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009
- Stanova, N. (2012). Democratic learning and fiscal rules in the political budget cycles of the CEE countries. International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies, 5 (2), 168-182. DOI: 10.1504/IJEPEE.2012.048501
- Tujula, M., Wolswijk, G. (2007). Budget balances in OECD countries: what makes them change? Empirica, 34, 1-14. DOI: 10.1007/s10663-006-9015-y
- Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25 (1), 63-77.
- Cited by
- ISSN
- 1644-0757
- Language
- eng
- URI / DOI
- http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/ASPE.2018.17.2.28