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Author
Paientko Tetiana (Kyiv National Economic University n. a. Vadym Hetman, Kyiv, Ukraine), Oparin Valeriy (Kyiv National Economic University n.a. Vadym Hetman, Kyiv, Ukraine), Sarnetska Yana (Kyiv National Economic University n.a. Vadym Hetman, Kyiv, Ukraine)
Title
Internal Tax Competition: Does This Result in Economic and Investment Growth?
Wewnętrzna konkurencja podatkowa: wzrost gospodarczy i inwestycyjny
Source
Nauki o Finansach / Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu, 2020, vol. 25, nr 1, s. 23-34, rys., tab., bibliogr. 28 poz.
Financial Sciences / Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu
Keyword
Podatki, Konkurencja, Decentralizacja, Produkt krajowy brutto (PKB), Akumulacja kapitału
Taxes, Competition, Decentralization, Gross domestic product (GDP), Capital formation
Note
JEL Classification: E62, E66, F62, H23
streszcz., summ.
Abstract
Celem tego artykułu jest ocena wpływu konkurencji podatkowej na poziomie krajowym na wzrost gospodarczy i akumulację kapitału. Wewnętrzna konkurencja podatkowa została rozpatrzona z punktu widzenia decentralizacji fiskalnej. Współczynnik decentralizacji dochodów podatkowych oraz współczynnik decentralizacji dochodów są wykorzystywane w artykule jako niezależne zmienne w analizie regresji panelowej. Jako zmienne zależne stosuje się wzrost PKB na mieszkańca i wzrost nakładów inwestycyjnych. Testy przeprowadzono na próbie 26 krajów. Wyniki analizy wykazały, że międzynarodowa konkurencja podatkowa między krajami ma większy wpływ na PKB na mieszkańca i nakłady inwestycyjne niż konkurencja podatkowa w kraju. Nie wynika to jednak z charakteru konkurencji podatkowej, ale z tego, że nie wszystkie kraje wykorzystują potencjał konkurencji podatkowej w tym kraju. Perspektywą dla dalszych badań jest analiza wpływu decentralizacji fiskalnej na efektywność rządów i wzrost gospodarczy w różnych grupach krajów.(abstrakt oryginalny)

The purpose of the article is to assess the impact of tax competition at national level on economic growth and capital formation. The internal tax competition was considered from the point of view of fiscal decentralisation. The tax revenue decentralization ratio and revenue decentralization ratio are used in this paper as independent variables in panel regression analysis. As dependent variables, GDP per capita growth and capital formation growth were used. Analysis was conducted on a sample of 26 countries. The results of the analysis showed that international tax competition between countries has a greater effect on GDP per capita and capital formation than tax competition within the country. However, this is not due to the nature of tax competition, but to the fact that not all countries use the potential of tax competition within the country. The direction for further research is to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on the effectiveness of governments and economic growth in different groups of countries.(original abstract)
Accessibility
The Library of Warsaw School of Economics
The Library of University of Economics in Katowice
The Main Library of the Wroclaw University of Economics
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ISSN
2080-5993
Language
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.15611/fins.2020.1.03
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