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Author
Dugiel Wanda (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie), Latoszek Ewa (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie)
Title
Legitymizacja działań Światowej Organizacji Handlu, a kryzys Organu Apelacyjnego systemu rozstrzygania sporów
The Legitimacy of the Activities of the World Trade Organization and the Crisis of the Appellate Body of the Dispute Settlement System
Source
Horyzonty Polityki, 2022, vol. 13, nr 43, s. 97-117, rys., bibliogr. 75 poz.
Issue title
Prawo a społeczeństwo - aktualne problemy legislacji i polityk publicznych
Keyword
Handel międzynarodowy, Spory międzynarodowe
International trade, International disputes
Note
streszcz., summ.
Company
Światowa Organizacja Handlu
World Trade Organization (WTO)
Country
Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki
United States of America (USA)
Abstract
CEL NAUKOWY: Celem artykułu jest zbadanie przyczyn, efektywności i możliwości wyjścia z kryzysu systemu rozstrzygania sporów WTO (World Trade Organization), w tym Organu Apelacyjnego w warunkach słabnącej legitymizacji dla funkcjonowania i akceptacji procedur Światowej Organizacji Handlu.
PROBLEM I METODY BADAWCZE: W artykule zastosowano metodę jakościową i ilościową do analizy kontrowersji związanych z funkcjonowaniem Organu Apelacyjnego WTO. Do analizy efektywności działania Organu Apelacyjnego w zakresie procedur rozstrzygania sporów między państwami w handlu międzynarodowym zastosowano teorię organizacji międzynarodowej oraz teorię wyboru publicznego.
PROCES WYWODU: Na podstawie teorii organizacji międzynarodowej i teorii wyboru publicznego w artykule omówiono problematykę legitymizacji społecznej dla tworzenia i egzekwowania norm WTO, pozwalających na proces liberalizacji handlu międzynarodowego. Następnie przedstawiono efektywność systemu rozstrzygania sporów, w tym Organu Apelacyjnego, która umożliwiła działanie WTO w ograniczeniu działań protekcjonistycznych państw.
WYNIKI ANALIZY NAUKOWEJ: Analiza naukowa potwierdziła efektywność systemu rozstrzygania sporów WTO odnośnie do liberalizacji handlu międzynarodowego. Słabnąca legitymizacja społeczna i normatywna systemu rozstrzygania sporów, w tym Organu Apelacyjnego WTO, w wyniku ograniczenia poparcia dla idei wolnego handlu w wielu państwach członkowskich WTO, w szczególności w Stanach Zjednoczonych, uniemożliwiła reformowanie reguł WTO.
WNIOSKI, INNOWACJE I REKOMENDACJE: W dalszej analizie należy podjąć badania naukowe dotyczące zreformowania systemu rozstrzygania sporów w rozwiązaniach regionalnych bez udziału Stanów Zjednoczonych. Niezbędne jest również zbadanie wzrostu poziomu protekcjonizmu w handlu międzynarodowym w efekcie zablokowania działalności Organu Apelacyjnego. (abstrakt oryginalny)

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The aim of the article is to examine the causes, effectiveness and possibilities of overcoming the crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system, including the Appellate Body, in conditions of weakening legitimacy for the functioning and acceptance of the World Trade Organization procedures.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The article uses the qualitative and quantitative method to analyze the controversies related to the functioning of the WTO Appellate Body. The theory of international organization and the theory of public choice were used to analyze the effectiveness of the Appellate Body's operations in the field of dispute settlement procedures between states in international trade.
THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: Based on the theory of international organization and the theory of public choice, the article discusses the issues of social legitimization for the creation and enforcement of WTO standards that allow the process of liberalization of international trade. Next, the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system, including the Appellate Body, is presented, which allowed the WTO to act in limiting protectionist actions by states.
RESEARCH RESULTS: Scientific analysis has confirmed the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system in terms of liberalizing international trade. The weakening social and normative legitimacy of the dispute settlement system, including the WTO Appellate Body, as a result of reduced support for the idea of free trade in many WTO member states, in particular in the United States, made it impossible to reform WTO rules.
CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Further analysis should be carried out on scientific research on the reform of the dispute settlement system in regional solutions without the participation of the United States. It is also necessary to examine the increase in the level of protectionism in international trade as a result of blocking the activity of the Appellate Body. (original abstract)
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ISSN
2082-5897
Language
pol
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/HP.2293
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