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Homoncik Bartłomiej (Cracow University of Economics, Poland)
Conditions and Assumptions of the Technology, Trade and Investment Collaboration Framework (TTIC)
Academic Review of Business and Economics (ARBE), 2023, vol. 4(1), s. 73-89, tab., wykr., bibliogr. 29 poz.
Łańcuch dostaw, Nowe technologie, Współpraca gospodarcza
Supply chain, High-tech, Economic cooperation
JEL Classification: F5, F52
Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki, Chiny
United States of America (USA), China
The US-Taiwan Technology, Trade and Investment Collaboration framework is one of the American responses to the semiconductor Global Value Chains pandemic disruptions. It calls for closer economic and technological cooperation in the microchip industry including two-way investment. The aim of the study is to determine the potential positive and negative effects of TTIC within the context of complex Sino-American relations, and new approaches to globalisation with a special focus on its friend-shoring features. As the outcome of the analysis of the secondary data from research papers or reports and the descriptive research method conducted in this paper, TTIC appears as a balanced means of addressing the supply chain disruptions in the key sectors of the economy. (original abstract)
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