BazEkon - Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

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Autor
Prokop Jacek (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie)
Tytuł
Taktyki defensywne przeciwko przejęciom
Defensive Tactics against Takeovers
Źródło
Gospodarka Narodowa, 2002, nr 11-12, s. 17-37, bibliogr. 56 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Przejęcie przedsiębiorstwa, Fuzje i przejęcia
Corporate acquisitions, Mergers and acquisitions
Uwagi
streszcz.
Abstrakt
W artykule omówiono taktyki defensywne przed przejęciami i przedstawiono wyniki badań nad skutkami ich stosowania z punktu widzenia akcjonariuszy spółek będących celem wykupu.
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Bibliografia
Pokaż
  1. Baron D.B,[1983], Tender Offers and Management Resistance, "Journal of Finance", vol. 38, s. 331-343.
  2. Bebchuk LA., [1982], The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, "Harvard Law Review", wol. 95, ss. 1028-1056.
  3. Bhagat S. Brickley J., [1984], The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Righis, "Journal of Law And Economics", vol. 27,ss. 339-365,
  4. Bishop M., Kay J., red., [193], European Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford University Press.
  5. Boland I, [1984], Missing the Bottom Line on Greenmail, "Wall Strect Journal "(25 lipca).
  6. Bradley M., Wakeman L.M., [1983], 7he Wealth Effects of Target Share Repurchases, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 11, ss. 301-328.
  7. Brealey R.A., Myers S.C.. [1991], Principles of Corporate Finance, wyd. czwarte, McGraw-1 Inc.
  8. Brickley J., Lease R., Smith C., [1988], Ownership Structure and the Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 20, ss. 267-91
  9. Comment R., Schwert G.W., [1995], Poison or Placebo? Rvidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 39, ss. 3-43
  10. Daley L., Subramaniam C., [1985], The Effects of Golden Parachutes on Synergy Sharing in Mercers, working paper, University of Minnesota Accounting Department.
  11. Dann L.Y., DeAngelo H., [1983], Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 11, ss. 275-300.
  12. Davis E., Shore G., Thompson D., [1993], Continental Mergers are Different ,w: Bishop M., Kay I. red., European Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford University Press, ss. 328-347.
  13. DeAngelo H., DeAngelo L., Rice E. M., [1984], Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, "Journal of Law and Economics", vol. 27,ss. 367-402
  14. DeAngelo H., Rice E.M., [1983], Antitakeover Charter Amendmients and Stockkolder Wealth, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 11, ss. 329-360.
  15. Dodd P., Leftwich R., [1980], The Market for Corporate Charts: Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation," Journal of Business", vol. 53, ss. 259-283.
  16. Easterbrook E.H., Fischel D.R., [1981], The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, "Harvard Law Review", vol. 94, ss. 1161-1204.
  17. Franks J., Mayer C., [1993], European Capital Markeys and Corporate Control, w: Bishop M. KayI J., red., European Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford University Press, ss. 162-199.
  18. Frąckowiak W, red.,[198]. Fuzje i przejęcia przedsiębiorstw, Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.
  19. Geroski P., Vlassopoulos A., [1993], "Recent Patterns of European Merger Activity", w: Bishop M., Kay J. red, European Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford University Press, ss. 318-327.
  20. Harris E.G, (1990), Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Sharkolders Welfare", RAND Journal of Economics", vol 21, ss. 614-625.
  21. Harris M., Raviv A., [1988], Corporate Control Coniests and Capital Structure, "Journal of Financial Economics", vo. 20, ss. 55-86
  22. Hermalin B., [1987), Adverse Effaces of the Threat of Takeovers, maszynopis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
  23. Herzel L., Shepro R.W., [1990], Bidders and Target: Mergers and Acgnisitions in the U.S., Basil Blackwell,Inc, Cambrigde, Mas.
  24. Holderness C.G., Shechan D.P., [1985], Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 14, ss. 555-579.
  25. Hughes, A. (1993), Mergers and Economic Performance in the UK: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence 1950-1990, w: European Mergers and Merger Policy, Bishop M., J. Kay (red.), Oxford University Press, s. 9-95,
  26. Jarrell G.A., [1985], The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, "Journal of Law and Economics", vol. 28,ss.151-177.
  27. Jarzell G.A., Bradley M., [1980], The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers," Journal of Law and Economics", vol. 23, 371-407.
  28. Jarrell G.A., Brickley J.A., Netter J.M., [1988],The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, "Journal of Economic Perspectives", vol. 2ss. 49-68.
  29. Jarrell G.A., Poulsen AB., [1987], Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments since 1980, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 19, ss. 127-168.
  30. Jarrell G.A., Poulsen A.B., [1938], Dual Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent Evidence," Journal of Financial Economics", vol. ss. 129-52.
  31. Jensen M.C., Ruback R.S., [1983], The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 1, ss. 5-50.
  32. Karpoff J.M., Malatesta PH., [1989], The Wealth Effects of Second Generation State Takeoner Legislation, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 25, ss. 291-322
  33. Kirkland R., [1984], When Paying off a Raider Benefits the Shareholders. Fortune (30 kwietnia), ss. 152-158.
  34. Knoeber C.R., [1986], Golden Parachuies, Shark Repellenis, and Hostile Taksovers, "American Economic Review", vol. 20, s. 155-167.
  35. Laffont J.-J. Trole J., 1988], Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers," RAND Journal of Economics", vol. 19,ss. 516-537.
  36. Lambert R., Larcker D., [1985], Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making, and Sharcholder Wealth, "Journal of Accounting and Economics", 7 kwietnia, ss. 179-204.
  37. Linn S.C., MeConnell J.-J. [1983], An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Antitakeover" Amendments on Common Stock Prices, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 11, ss. 361-399.
  38. Mahoney J.M., Sundaramurthy C., Mahoney J.T, [1995], The Differential Impact on Stockholder Wealth of Variaus Antitakeover Provisions, Research Paper £9512, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  39. Malatesta P.H., Walkling R.A., [1988], Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitabiliy, and Ownership Structure, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 20, ss. 347-376.
  40. Mikkelson W.H., Ruback R., [1985], An Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Investment Process," Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 14, s. 523-553.
  41. Netter J.M., [1987], Shareholder Wealth Effects of Litigation Based on Allegedly False Schedule 13D Item 4 Disclosure, working paper.
  42. OCE, [1984], The Impact of Targetted Share Repurchases (Grzenmail) on Stock Prices, Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission.
  43. OCE,[1985], The Economics of Any-or-Al, Panial, and Two-Fer Tender Offers, Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission.
  44. OCE, [1987a), The Effects of Dual-Class Recapitalizations on the Wealth of Sharcholdzrs, Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission.
  45. OCE, [19876], Skareholder Wealth Effects of Ohio Legislation Affecting Takeovers, Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission.
  46. OCE, [1987c], Update - The Effects of Dual-Class Recapitalizations on Sharcholder Wealth: Inc luding Evidence from 1986 and 1987, Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission.
  47. Partch M, [1987], The Creation of A Class of Limited Voting Common Stock and Shareholders Wealth, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 18, ss. 313-339.
  48. Romano R., [1985], Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, "Journal of Law, Economics and Organization", vol. 61, s. 225-267.
  49. Romano R., [1993], Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, "Fordham Law Review", vol. 61, ss. 843-864.
  50. Ruback RS. [1986]. An Overview of Takeover Defenses, working paper. No. 1836-86, Sloan School of Management, MIT, wrzesień.
  51. Ryngaert M., [1988], The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, "Journal of Financial Economics", vol. 20, s. 377-417.
  52. Ryngaert M., NetterI, [1990], Skareholder Wealth Effecis of the 1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law Rewisied: Its Real Effects, "Journal of Law, Economics and Organization", vol. 6, ss. 253-262.
  53. Schumann L., [1987], The State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Effects of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes, Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, marzec,
  54. Shleifer A., Vishny R.W., [1986], Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders" Interest," RAND Journal of Economics", vol. 17, ss.293-309.
  55. Stein I.C., [1988], Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, "Journal of Political Economy", vol. 96, s. 61-80.
  56. Sudarsanam S., [1998], Fuzje i przejęcia, WIG PRESS, Warszawa.
Cytowane przez
Pokaż
ISSN
0867-0005
Język
pol
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