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Wojtyna Andrzej (Kolegium Ekonomii, Finansów i Prawa)
Bank centralny w świetle teorii agencji
Central Bank in the Context of Agency Theory
Gospodarka Narodowa, 2004, nr 9, s. 1-22, bibliogr. 33 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Banki centralne, Teoria agencji, Proces podejmowania decyzji
Central banks, Agency theory, Decision making process
Celem artykułu było zaprezentowanie pewnych wątków badań, w których perspektywa teorii agencji jest w sposób wyraźny wykorzystywana do analizy polityki banku centralnego. Przedstawiono także relacje agencji wewnątrz banku centralnego w zakresie przepływu informacji, podejmowania decyzji i systemu bodźców kształtujących zachowania decydentów.

The article is devoted to possibilities of applying agency theory in research into efficiency of institutional solutions in central banks. Its first part presents factors due to which, like in many other cases of agency relationship, it is also in reference to central bank that drawing up appropriate practical solutions turns out to be a very complicated task giving rise giving rise to a lot of controversy and even political emotions. The second part of the article is focused on those tenets of theoretical research, which while treating the central bank as an agent aim at an optimum contract allowing central bank independence to be tied with requirements for its democratic accountability. In the third part, emphasis is put on agency relations within the central bank. It discusses the results of numerous studies of various aspects of efficiency of making central banks' decisions by committees. In conclusions of this article several remarks are made about possibilities of applying agency theory in analyses of institutional solutions adopted in the National Bank of Poland. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
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