BazEkon - Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

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Autor
Freytag Andreas
Tytuł
EMU Enlargement and Central Bank Independence: Which Concept of Convergence to Apply?
Rozszerzenie Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej i niezależność banku centralnego. Jaką zastosować koncepcję konwergencji?
Źródło
Bank i Kredyt, 2007, nr 11-12, s. 17-33, aneksy, bibliogr. 57 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Unia Gospodarcza i Walutowa (UGW), Konwergencja, Niezależność banku centralnego
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Convergence, Central bank independence
Uwagi
summ., streszcz.
Kraj/Region
Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia
Central and Eastern Europe
Abstrakt
Rozszerzenie Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej nie zależy jedynie od indywidualnego stanu procesu konwergencji kandydatów przystępujących do UGiW, ale także od ich sytuacji politycznej. Twierdzimy zatem, że konwergencja instytucjonalna, w szczególności wiążąca politykę pieniężną, jest równie (jeśli nie bardziej) istotna dla prowadzenia pomyślnej polityki monetarnej w eurolandzie niż konwergencja nominalna i realna. Zgodnie z konstytucyjnymi ramami ekonomii politycznej, oceniamy za pomocą rożnych miar stopień niezależności banku centralnego (CBI) w krajach środkowej i Wschodniej Europy. Można wykazać, że stopień niezależności banku centralnego w tych krajach jest znaczny. Istnieje jednakże (zmniejszająca się) różnica w stosunku do niezależności EBC, w zakresie zewnętrznych aspektów niezależności. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EMU enlargement not only depends on the individual state of convergence of the accession candidates, but also on their political situation. Therefore, we argue that institutional convergence, in particular monetary policy binding, is equally - if not more - important for successful monetary policy in Euroland than nominal and real convergence. Based on a constitutional political economy framework, we assess the degree of central bank independence (CBI) in CEE using different measures. It can be shown that the degree of central bank independence in CEE countries is considerably high; however, there is a (decreasing) gap to the ECB's independence with respect to external aspects of CBI. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
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Bibliografia
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ISSN
0137-5520
Język
eng
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