BazEkon - Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

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Autor
Kosiec Krzysztof (Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie / Wydział Ekonomii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych)
Tytuł
Rola asymetrii informacji o popycie w optymalizacji struktur kapitałowych : przeciw hipotezie efektywności
The Role of Asymmetrical Information on Demand in the Optimisation of Capital Structures : Against the Effectiveness Hypothesis
Źródło
Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie. Seria Specjalna, Monografie, 2007, nr 177, 197 s., bibliogr. s.174-187, Aneks
Słowa kluczowe
Rynek kapitałowy, Wycena aktywów kapitałowych, Wartość rynkowa przedsiębiorstwa, Optymalizacja matematyczna, Popyt, Modele ekonometryczne, Przegląd literatury, Rozprawa habilitacyjna
Capital market, Capital asset valuation, Market value of enterprise, Mathematical optimization, Demand, Econometric models, Literature review, Habilitation thesis
Uwagi
summ.
Abstrakt
Opracowanie składa się z czterech części. Dwie pierwsze teoretyczne przedstawiają alternatywne ogólnorównowagowe teorie wyceny aktywów kapitałowych i ich cząstkoworównowagowe dopełnienia, z uwzględnieniem zasadniczego dla podjętych rozważań problemu, jakim jest wpływ decyzji finansowych firm na ich wartość rynkową. Natomiast dwa ostatnie modelowe zawierają skonstruowaną przez autora dwu etapową grę niewspółpracującą z bilateralną asymetrią informacji o popycie.

In economic theory there are currently many models of optimal capital structures. The aim of this work is to find an answer to the question whether asymmetrical information about stochastic demand on product markets may be used by duopolistic companies in the process of optimising their capital structures. The thesis comprises four chapters. In chapter one, the author presents alternative general equilibrium theories on the valuation of capital assets, while in chapter two he presents their partial equilibrium complements, taking into account the key issue of the influence of companies' financial decisions on their market value. The model section of the work contains a two-stage game - designed by the author - that is a non-collusive game with bilateral asymmetrical information about demand, with bankruptcy law institutions. In particular, the initial conditions of the game are specified in chapter three, while in chapter four the course of the game and its fundamental results are discussed. On the basis of the arguments presented in chapters three and four of the work, it should be stated that asymmetrical information about demand may be used by duopolistic companies to establish the rules of the product market game (Cournot or Stackelberg), which may lead - depending on the specific informational features of the product game - both to symmetrical and asymmetrical capital structures.(AT)
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Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Bibliografia
Pokaż
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