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Kamiński Antoni Z.
Korupcja jako symbol instytucjonalnej niewydolności państwa i zagrożenie dla rozwoju polityczno-gospodarczego Polski
Corruption as a Symptom of Institutional Disability of the State and a Threat to Poland`s Political and Economic Growth
Zeszyty Centrum im. Adama Smitha, 1997, nr 29, s. 3-32, bibliogr. 72 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Korupcja, Rozwój gospodarczy państwa, Instytucjonalizacja gospodarki, Przegląd literatury
Corruption, Economic development of the country, Institutionalization of the economy, Literature review
Przeanalizowano zjawisko korupcji jako symptom schorzenia o charakterze moralno-umysłowym. Zwrócono uwagę na fakt, że sukcesy gospodarcze Polski nie powinny przesłaniać potencjalnych zagrożeń w sferze politycznej.

The paper critically examines some justifications for the tolerance of corruption by the post-1989 governments in Poland: its role in overcoming administrative rigidities and red tape; the supposed lack of evidence for the negative impact of corruption on economic growth; and its role in generating native capital and a materially independent middle class. It demonstrates that corruption presents a critical problem for the transition from communism to liberal democracy. The transition consists inter alia in the privatisation of economic assets, i.e., the full scale change in the nature of property rights carried on by the government. It is accompanied by the influx of foreign capital, under the still strong presence of the state in the economy; and expanding opportunities for material gains in the East connected with the evolution of the quasi-informal economy, and the mafia type relations in the post-Soviet world. The liberal-democratic transition is threatened above all by the degradation of the state which also undermines the emerging market institutions. Importance of the state is emphasised because the success of transition depends on the quality of constitutional choices, on quality of laws enacted by the parliament, effectiveness of their implementation and integrity of law enforcement. The paper examines the patterns of corruption under post-Solidarity, and post-communist governments. It demonstrates that while the former tolerated the massive presence of the conflict of interests, the latter have actively taken the destiny into their hands by enacting laws designed for the purpose of creating opportunities for rent seeking (the thieves in law). It is claimed that corruption undermines the principle of formal equality; creates a system of illegitimate distributive privileges amplifying, thereby, material inequalities in society; imposes a matrix of incentives enforcing parasitic patterns of behaviour among the political and economic elites; weakens legitimacy of the state in society; contributes to the slowdown of economic growth due to the misallocation of resources, dysfunctional constraints on market competition leading to the growth of monopolies, rising transaction costs, and uncertainty of economic environment; disintegrates the apparatus of the state posing a threat to the sovereignty of the country. Thus, unless serious countermeasures are undertaken (also of the constitutional type), despite impressive rates of GNP growth Poland has enjoyed during the recent years, the country may soon face the prospect of a deep political crisis with strong economic implications.(original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
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