BazEkon - Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

BazEkon home page

Meny główne

Drabik Ewa (Politechnika Warszawska)
Wybrane modele aukcji asymetrycznych i ich zastosowanie
The Application of Selected Models Of Asymmetric Auctions
Studia i Prace Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, 2010, nr 10, s. 93-105, bibliogr. 7 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Aukcje, Sprzedaż
Auctions, Sale
Celem pracy jest zaprezentowanie podstawowych informacji dotyczących aukcji asymetrycznych, a także pokazanie, że jedna z bardziej znanych aukcji w Polsce, a mianowicie aukcja koni czystej krwi arabskiej Pride of Poland, która co roku odbywa się w sierpniu w Janowie Podlaskim, to typowa ustna aukcja (holendersko-angielska), asymetryczna w sensie angielskim. (fragment tekstu)

Auction theory is one of the most influential and widely studied economic theories. Auctions are used in a huge number of transactions across numerous markets. The rules of auctions are applied in the sale of treasury bills, on foreign exchanges, and in mineral rights and other assets. Houses, used cars, agricultural products including livestock, arts and antiques are all commonly auctioned. There has recently been an explosion of interest in designing a new form of auction, for example to set up new electricity, transport or 3G markets. Trading rules in auctions are the "rules of the game" and therefore a variety of auction strategies are based on the principles of game theory. The diverse trading rules used in auctions share numerous common features. Auctions may be oral or written. In oral auctions, bidders hear each other's bids and make counteroffers, and each bidder knows his rivals. In written or closed auctions, bidders do not know how many rival bidders are participating. As in most theoretical literature, auction experiments typically assume that bidders' valuations or signals are drawn from the same probability distribution. Most models are in such cases therefore symmetrical. A very important theorem in the theory of symmetric auctions is the revenue of equivalence theorem, which predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of bidding rules. The symmetry assumption is violated in many real life auction environments, and bidders often know how they differ. In practice, auctioneers are biased in favour of selling to bidders whose values are drawn from lower distributions. The revenue of equivalence theorem doesn't apply to asymmetric auctions. However, there is literature on asymmetric auctions dealing with various kinds of asymmetries. Maskin and Riley [2000] explained the properties of several asymmetric two-bidder examples, where a first-order stochastic dominance is assumed. Moreover, it is known that, in practice, a bidder's knowledge about his rivals is unlikely to be symmetric. Asymmetric information about types of rivals has been described by Kim and Che [2004]. Every year in August at Janów Podlaski an auction of Arabian horses is held. In this paper we propose that the Polish Arabian horse market is asymmetric. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
  1. Drabik E. [2007], Aukcje w teorii i praktyce, Wydawnictwo SGGW, Warszawa.
  2. Kim J., Che Y.K. [2004], Asymmetric Information About Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions, "Games and Economic Behavior", vol. 46.
  3. Kuś A. [2009J, Modele i własności aukcji asymetrycznych, praca doktorska, SGH, Warszawa.
  4. Maskin E., Riley J. [2000], Asymmetric Auctions, "Review of Economic Studies", vol. 67.
  5. Milgrom P., Weber R. [1982], Theory of Auction and Competitive Bidding, "Econometrica", vol. 50, nr 5.
  6. Myerson R.B. [1981], Optimal Auction Design, "Mathematics of Operations Research", vol. 6.
  7. Vickrey W. [1961], Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, "Journal of Finance", vol. 16.
Cytowane przez
Udostępnij na Facebooku Udostępnij na Twitterze Udostępnij na Google+ Udostępnij na Pinterest Udostępnij na LinkedIn Wyślij znajomemu