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Kalinowski Sławomir
Konkurencja lub kooperacja w warunkach monopolu biletarnego z elementami przywództwa cenowego : Studium eksperymentalne
Competition or Cooperation in ilateral Monopoly whit Elements of Price Leadership. Experimental Study
Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu, 2007, nr 94, s. 77-98, wykr., bibliogr.18 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Konkurencja, Przywództwo, Ceny, Bilateralna wymiana handlowa
Competition, Leadership, Prices, Bilateral trade
Artykuł jest próbą poddania intersubiektywnemu testowi empirycznemu, wyników badań D. Harnetta i S. Siegela dotyczących zachowania się podmiotów w warunkach monopolu bilateralnego. (fragment tekstu)

In the article is an attempt to replicate and join the researches by D. Harnett, who supplemented Bowleys bilateral monopoly model with non-linear functions of average revenue and average cost, with experimental study made by S. Siegel and D. Harnett. They carried out a comparative study of behavior under complete and incomplete information. The paper presents the results of an experimental game in which players win profits, depending on the choice of their strategy. The purpose of the game for both players is to maximize the sum of profits from all performed iterations. The expected equilibrium point in the analyzed experiment is the price and quantity producing an equal split of maximum joint profits (P=8 and Q=17). Harnett's study confirmed this solution, which is Pareto optimal. The current version of the study brought the expected price level. Average quantity ordered by the buyers was significantly different from the expected Q=17. They achieved a higher outcome than half of the maximum joint profit. It was possible due to a more frequent application of the rivalry strategy in subsequent iterations. Sellers were forced to lower the price to the level that can produce an equal division of Pareto optimal outcome, but buyers did not reward them with the quantity that maximizes joint profit. The performed study was supplemented with the research on the influence of information conditions on the equilibrium solution. Incomplete information was limited to own payoff matrix and the strategy choices of the second player. The expected solution in these conditions was Bowley point. The study did not meet this expectation. The outcome was non-optimal quasi-equilibrium (best response of the buyer to the price offer of the seller) with an equal split of joint profit (P=10 and Q=9). The price was significantly lower than the Bowley point level (P=13) which could be the result of a high frequency of the rivalry strategy applied by the buyers, similarly to complete information conditions. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
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