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Fiala Petr (University of Economics in Prague, Czech Republic)
Multiobjective Combinatorial Auctions
Multiple Criteria Decision Making / University of Economics in Katowice, 2008, vol. 3, s. 21-34, rys., bibliogr. 15 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Optymalizacja wielokryterialna, Aukcje, Programowanie matematyczne, Podejmowanie decyzji
Multiple criteria optimization, Auctions, Mathematical programming, Decision making
summ., Korespondencja z redakcją: numeracja wpisana za zgodą redakcji (wynika z ciągłości wydawniczej serii MCDM) - brak numeracji na stronie tytułowej
Auctions are important market mechanisms for the allocation of goods and services. Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items. The advantage of combinatorial auctions is that the bidder can more fully express his preferences. This is particular important when items are complements. Allowing bidders more fully to express preferences often leads to improved economic efficiency and greater auction revenues. A typical combinatorial auction problem is the so called winner determination problem. The problem illustrates the possibility to formulate combinatorial auctions as mathematical programming problems as well as the complexity of combinatorial auctions. Auctions with complex bid structures are called multiobjective auctions, since they address multiple objectives in the negotiation space. Multiobjective optimization can be helpful for detailed analysis of combinatorial auctions. Buyers can specify weights and aspiration levels that express their desired values on the attributes of the items to be purchased. Interactive methods for multiobjective optimization are proposed for analysis of combinatorial auctions and for negotiation process.(original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Pełny tekst
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  2. Bichler M.: An Experimental Analysis of Multi-Attribute Auctions. "Decision Support Systems" 2000, 29, pp. 249-268.
  3. Bikhchandani S. and Ostroy J.M.: The Package Assignment Model. "Journal of Economic Theory" 2002, 107(2), pp. 377-406.
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  5. Combinatorial Auctions. Eds Cramton P., Shoham Y. and Steinberg R. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006.
  6. de Vries S. and Vohra R.V.: Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey. "INFORMS Journal of Computing" 2003, 15 (1), pp. 284-309.
  7. Fiala P.: An ANP/DNP Analysis of Economic Elements in Today's World Network Economy. "Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering" 2006, 15, pp. 131-140.
  8. Fiala P.: Models of Cooperative Decision Making. In: Multiple Criteria Decision Making. Eds: T. Gal and G. Fandel. Springer, 1937.
  9. Oliveira E., Fonsesca J.M., and Steiger-Garao A.: Multi-Criteria Negotiation in Multi-Agent Systems. In: 1st International Workshop of Central and Eastern Europe on Multi-Agent Systems (CEEMAS'99). St. Petersbourg 1999.
  10. Rothkopf M., Pekeč A., and Harstad R.: Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. "Management Science" 1998, 8, pp. 1131-1147.
  11. Saaty T.L.: The Analytic Hierarchy Process. RWS Publications, Pittsburgh 1996.
  12. Saaty T.L.: Decision Making with Dependence and Feedback: The Analytic Network Process. RWS Publications, Pittsburgh 2001.
  13. Saaty T.L.: Time Dependent Decision-Making; Dynamic Priorities in AHP/ANP: Generalizing from Points to Functions and from Real to Complex Variables. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Bali 1999, pp. 1-38.
  14. Sandholm T.: Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. "Artificial Intelligence" 2002, 135, pp. 1-54.
  15. Sandholm T., Boutilier C.: Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. In: Combinatorial Auctions. Eds P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg. MIT Press, Cambridge 2006.
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