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San Martín-Reyna Juan Manuel (Universidad de las Américas Puebla, Mexico), Durán-Encalada Jorge A. (Universidad de las Américas Puebla, Mexico)
Ownership Structure, Earnings Management and Investment Opportunity Set : Evidence from Mexican Firms
Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation (JEMI), 2012, vol. 8, nr 3, s. 35-57, tab., bibliogr. 91 poz.
Tytuł własny numeru
Management and Financial Issues of Mexican Entrepreneurship
Słowa kluczowe
Dźwignia finansowa, Przedsiębiorstwo rodzinne, Projekty inwestycyjne, Zarządzanie zyskami
Financial leverage, Family-owned business, Investment project, Earnings management
streszcz., summ.
Praca analizuje wpływ struktury własności, rady nadzorczej i dźwigni finansowej na zarządzanie zyskiem w sytuacjach, gdy przedsiębiorstwo staje wobec możliwości rentownego rozwoju i gdy taka możliwość nie istnieje. Badanie jest oparte o próbę 83 meksykańskich firm i dotyczy okresu 2005-2011. Rezultaty wskazują na pozytywny związek zachodzący pomiędzy zarządzaniem zyskiem i radą nadzorczą oraz dźwignią finansową w sytuacji możliwości rozwoju firmy. Związek ten ma charakter ujemny, gdy firma nie ma możliwości podjęcia rentownych projektów inwestycyjnych. Rezultaty wskazują także na znaczenie kontroli udziałowców firmy na zarządzanie zyskiem w sytuacji potencjalnego wzrostu. W podsumowaniu, struktura własności, skład i wielkość rady oraz dźwignia finansowa redukują zarządzanie zyskiem w sytuacji braku możliwości podjęcia projektów inwestycyjnych i mają dodatni wpływ, gdy takie możliwości pojawiają się. (abstrakt oryginalny)

This paper analyses the influence of ownership, board of directors, and financial leverage on companies' performance when these either face, or do not face, profitable growth opportunities. Towards that end we examined a sample of 83 listed Mexican firms during the period 2005-2011. The results confirm the relevance of debt and board of directors in terms of firm market value by showing a negative relationship between performance and both, board of directors and leverage, in the presence of growth opportunities. In contrast, the relationship between debt and performance becomes positive when firms have no profitable investment projects. The results also demonstrate that the relevance of controlling shareholders on firm value is different when firms have or not growth opportunities. Therefore, our results show that ownership structure, composition and size of board and the level of leverage play a dual role on performance (increase or decrease the firm value) and determine whether the firms have profitable investment projects. (original abstract)
Pełny tekst
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