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Autor
Gluchman Vasil
Tytuł
Non-Utilitarian Consequentialism: A History of the Last Decades
Źródło
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne, 2008, nr 1 (1), s. 55-72
Humanum. International Social and Humanities Studies
Słowa kluczowe
Etyka, Moralność, Historia filozofii
Ethics, Morality, History of philosophy
Uwagi
summ
Abstrakt
The growing importance of the non-utilitarian consequentialism since the early 1980s stems from renewed efforts to respond to the criticism of traditional utilitarian and consequentialist utilitarianism.1 Despite the fact that non-utilitarian consequentialism started almost 20 years ago, it cannot be considered as fully established ethical theory. One of the essential reasons for this that non-utilitarian consequentialism is rejected by some utilitarians who hold that consequentialism is utilitarianism and any attempt to develop a non-utilitarian consequentialist theory should be considered outside consequentialism.(fragment of text)
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Bibliografia
Pokaż
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ISSN
1898-8431
Język
eng
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