BazEkon - Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

BazEkon home page

Meny główne

Autor
Symonides Janusz
Tytuł
Spory terytorialne na Morzu Południowochińskim. Czy powrót do "dyplomacji kanonierek"?
Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. Return of "Gunboat Diplomacy"?
Źródło
Stosunki Międzynarodowe, 2012, t. 46, nr 2, s. 33-58, rys., bibliogr. 61 poz.
International Relations
Słowa kluczowe
Polityka morska, Konflikty zbrojne, Granice państwa, Międzynarodowe prawo morza
Maritime policy, Armed conflicts, State boundaries, International law of the sea
Uwagi
summ.
Kraj/Region
Morze Południowochińskie, Chiny, Wietnam, Malezja, Filipiny, Tajwan
South China Sea, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan
Abstrakt
Morze Południowochińskie rozciąga się od Singapuru i Cieśniny Malakka do Cieśniny Tajwańskiej i obejmuje obszar około 3.500.000 km2. Ze względu na ograniczone cieśninami wejście, jest ono uznawane za morze półzamknięte. Wokół niego położone są Chiny, Tajwan, Filipiny, Malezja, Brunei, Indonezja, Singapur i Wietnam. Z wyjątkiem Indonezji i Singapuru wszystkie państwa nadbrzeżne toczą między sobą spory terytorialne o suwerenność nad położonymi na tym morzu wyspami, skałami, atolami, rafami i płyciznami, których jest ponad 250, przy czym najbardziej zdecydowane roszczenia wysuwają ChRL (i Tajwan) oraz Wietnam i Filipiny do wysp Spratly, Paracelskich i Macclesfield wraz z płycizną Scarborough. Spór między Chinami a Wietnamem Południowym o wyspy Paracelskie doprowadził w 1974 r. do konfliktu zbrojnego, w wyniku którego siły południowowietnamskie zostały pokonane, śmierć poniosło kilkudziesięciu żołnierzy wietnamskich, a cały archipelag Paracelski został zajęty przez ChRL. Z kolei w związku ze sporem o wyspy Spratly doszło między Chinami a Wietnamem w 1988 r. do starcia zbrojnego, w wyniku którego zostało zatopionych kilka jednostek wietnamskich, zginęło siedemdziesięciu marynarzy, a sześć wysepek i raf zostało opanowanych przez Chiny. Incydenty z użyciem okrętów oraz jednostek straży granicznej i statków patrolowych miały też miejsce między Chinami a Filipinami. Do incydentów w kontekście sporów dotyczących wysp Spratly dochodziło także między okrętami i statkami Filipin, Malezji, Wietnamu, a nawet Tajwanu. (fragment tekstu)

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, lasting for tens of years, became particularly fierce in 2009-2012 as a result of activities of disputing parties. These disputes concern sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal, as well as demarcation of disputed areas of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. Furthermore, the United States and China are in disagreement over freedom to navigate the sea by military ships in exclusive economic zones. The disputes concern then the right to exploit areas rich in oil and gas deposits, and the right to fish. If it comes to geopolitical dimension, the dispute over freedom of navigation means the dispute over control of the waters through which shipping routes pass, which are of key signifi cance to the world maritime trade. Although ASEAN and China adopted the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, providing for peaceful solution of existing disputes without resorting to threat and use of force, by means of friendly consultations and negotiations, in accordance with principles of international law, and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, militarization of these waters takes place. Due to complex legal nature of the dispute and exclusion of possibility to appeal to international courts, it seems that despite ongoing works on adopting obligatory code of conduct between ASEAN and China, there is a little chance for legal settlement of these disputes in the nearest future. An important step towards reduction of existing tensions could be adopting principles of common exploitation and management of disputed areas, as well as mutual confidence-building measures and developing cooperation. However, progressing militarization of the South China Sea, nationalist tendencies and "patriotic" involvement of societies make seeking and reaching compromises diffi cult. Although in this situation there is no threat of war or armed confl icts on a big scale, probability of employing armed forces in these disputes, and even some incidents involving them seem possible, and even unavoidable. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Bibliografia
Pokaż
  1. J. Shen, China 's Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective, "Chinese Journal of International Law" 2002, t. 1
  2. H. Chiu, C.H. Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, "Ocean Development & International Law" 1975, t. 1.
  3. J. Yuan, Emerging maritime rivalry in The South China Sea: Territorial Disputes, Sea-lane Security, and the Pursuit of Power, "Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada", international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/.../Repot-South_China_Sea.aspx?v... (28.09.2012);
  4. L.B. Bautista, Thinking Outside the Box: The South China Sea Issue and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, http://law.upd.edu.ph/plj/images/files/PLJ%20volume%2081/PLJ%20volume%2081%20 number%204%20-04-%20Lowell%20B.%20Bautista%20-%20Thinking%20outside%20the%20Box.pdf (24.09.2012)
  5. East & Southeast Asia, Spratly Islands, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countyrytemplate-pg.html (26.09.2012)
  6. BBC News Asia-Pacific, Q&A: South China Sea Dispute, 11 maja 2012 r.
  7. Scarborough Shoal, Wikipedia;
  8. Z. Keykan, Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philip- pines Relations?, IBRU, Boundary and Security Bulletin, Summer 1999, s. 71.
  9. "Dziennik Ustaw" 2002, nr 59, poz. 543, załącznik.
  10. Nota skierowana przez stałą misję ChRL do sekretarza generalnego ONZ z 7 maja 2009 r., CML/17/2009.
  11. Nota stałego przedstawicielstwa Indonezji do sekretarza generalnego ONZ, nr 480/POL-703/VII/10.
  12. J. Symonides, Delimitacja obszarów morskich na Morzu Barentsa i Oceanie Arktycznym między Rosją a Norwegią. Współczesne problemy prawa, Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Profesorowi Jerzemu Młynarczykowi, Gdynia 2011.
  13. J. Symonides, Nowe prawo morza, Warszawa 1986, s. 243-314.
  14. J. Geng, The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS, "Merkourios. Utrecht Journal of International and European Law" 2012, t. 28, nr 74, s. 22-30;
  15. L.A. Rich, U.S. - China Military Conflicts in the Maritime Exclusive Economic Zone, United States Army War College, Strategy Research Project, Class 2012.
  16. S.A. Kan, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001; Assessments and Policy Implications, Congressional Research Service, October 2001, http://assests.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30946_20011010.pdf (03.09.2012).
  17. Pentagon Says Chinese Vessels Harassed U.S. Ships, CNN, com, March 9, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-03/politics/us.navy.china_1_chinese-ships-chinese-vessels-chinesie-media?s=PM:POLITICS (03.09.2012);
  18. U.S. Protests Harassing of Navy Ship by Chinese, Associated Press, March 9, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29596179 (03.09.2012).
  19. R. Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities in China's Exclusive Economic Zone, "Chinese Journal of International Law" 2010, t. 9.
  20. H. Zhang, Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States? - Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo's Article on Military Activities in the EEZ, "Chinese Journal of International Law" 2010, t. 9.
  21. S. Yee, Sketching the Debate on Military Activities in the EEZ: An Editorial Comment, "Chinese Journal of International Law 2010, t. 9.
  22. J. Ku, Should the U. S. Ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea? A Debate and Discussion, http://opiniojuris.org12012/06/14should-the-u-s-ratify-the-un-convention-on-the-law (20.08.2012);
  23. Take Action to Help US Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, "Citizens for Global Solutions" z 7 czerwca 2007 r., http://www.globalsolutions.org/node/728 (20.08.2012);
  24. B. Oxman, Another Side of the Sea Treaty Debate, "The Washington Times" z 5 kwietnia 2005 r.;
  25. G. Galdorsi, A UN Treaty We Can All Support, "Naval Institute Proceedings", http://stinet.dfic.mil/cgi_bin/GetTRDoc? (20.08.2012);
  26. J. Moore, W. Schachte, The Senate Should Give Immediate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention: Why the Critics Are Wrong, "Columbia Journal of International Affairs" 2005, t. 59, nr 1;
  27. J. Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention: A National Security Success, http://www.clgd.org/downloads/Kraska_LOS_24Oct.06.pdf (20.08.2012).
  28. J. Rogin, Clinton: Ratify Law of the Sea Treaty This Year, "The Cable" z 23 maja 2012 r.
  29. United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, http://www.un.org/Dept/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm (07.10.2012).
  30. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (08.09.2012)
  31. N. H. Thao, The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note, "Ocean Development & International Law" 2003, t. 34 s. 279-280;
  32. L. Buszynski, ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct and the South China Sea, "Contemporary South East Asia" 2003, t. 25, s. 343 i n.
  33. W. Shicun, R. Huaifeng, More Than a Declaration: A Commentary on the Background and Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, "Chinese Journal of International Law" 2003, t. 2, s. 311-319.
  34. C. Hsiu, Why Code of Conduct failed, China and ASEAN in South China Sea Dispute, Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan; L.B. Bautista, op. cit., s. 709.
  35. The Senior Officials "Meeting for the Implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea". Reaches an Agreement on the Guidelines, 20 lipca 2011 r., http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/1841727.htm (02.09.2012);
  36. ASEAN Secretariat, Guidelines for the Implementation of DOC; http://www.aseansec.org/documents/20185-DOC.pdf (02.09.2012).
  37. M. Adamrah, ASEAN Can Persuade China toward CoC Negotiation, Mediate Region All Conflicts, "The Jakarta Post" z 25 listopada 2011 r.;
  38. C. Thayer, The China - Philippines Face Off at Scarborough Shoal: Back to Square One?, "e-International Relations" z 26 kwietnia 2012 r.
  39. A. Baviera, China and the South China Sea: Time for Code of Conduct?, "RSIS Commentaries", nr 91 z 14 czerwca 2011 r., http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publicationbs/Perspective/RSIS0912011.pdf (26.08.2012).
  40. E. Brennan, The South China Sea: Resetting the Chessboard, Institute for Security & Development Policy, "Policy Brief', nr 88 z 22 lutego 2012 r.;
  41. Ch.I. Bedford, An Arms Race in the South China Sea, "Canadian Naval Review" 2011, t. 7, nr 3, s. 39-40;
  42. R. Scott, China to Take Naval Forces to Another Level Over Next Decade, www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065926378 (30.09.2012).
  43. S. Khurana-Gurpreet, China's South Fleet Gains Strength: Indicators, Intentions & Implications, India Strategic, www.indiastrategic.in/topstories 183.htm (30.09.2012).
  44. C. Guangijn, China won't take part in arms race, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/24/content-14680589.htm (30.09.2012).
  45. K. Hanly, U.S. Asia Pivot Fuels Conflict With China, digitaljournal.com/print/article/330996 (24.09.2012)
  46. J. Glaser, U.S. Provoking China Militarily, in Both Rhetoric and Policy, www.news.antiwar.com/2012/08/16/us-provokong-china-militarily-in-both-rethoric-and-policy-2 (23.09.2012);
  47. J. Hardy, Analysis; U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy Provokes Mixed Responses from China, www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065932124 (30.09.2012).
  48. R. Rozoff, Militarization of Asia-Pacific: America Revives And Expands Cold War Military Alliances Against China, "Global Research" z 9 czerwca 2012 r.
  49. D. Berteau, M. Green, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment, August 1, 2012, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington D.C. 20515.
  50. R.D. Kaplan, The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict, "Foreign Policy" z września/października 2011 r., www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the-south-china-sea-is-the-future-of-conflict?print=... (02.10.2012).
  51. H. White, Power Shift: Australia's Future between Washington and Beijing, "Quarterly Essay" nr 39 z września 2010 r.
  52. Philippines Refuses to Budge on South China Sea Rrow, www.news.yahoo.comm/philipines-refusesbudge-south-china-sea-row-104342257.html (30.09.2012).
  53. Royal Brunei Navy, Royal Brunei Armed Forces, Wikipedia.
  54. J. Perlez, China Send Troops to Disputed Islands, "New York Times" z 23 lipca 2012 r.;
  55. Z. Shengan, Zang Yunbi, Shansha Military Garrison Established, ChinaDaily.com.cn
  56. R. Fisher, South China Competition: China Contemplates More Mischief, www.strategycenter.net/research/publD.209/pub-detil.asp (28.09.2012).
  57. M. Pennington, China Raising Tension in Disputed Sea: US, www.irrawaddy.org/archives/10880 (28.09.2012) .
  58. P.C. Cronin, Can Taiwan Bring Peace to the South and East China Seas, September 25, 2012, www.thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/.../Taiwan-should-work-for-peace-in-south-and-east-china-seas/... (26.09.2012) .
  59. H. Docena, Building Security in South China, https://afsc.org/story/Herbert-docena-buildsng-security-south-china-sea (26.09.2012).
  60. "Dziennik Ustaw" 1931, nr 97, poz. 747.
  61. Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses, "Asia Report" nr 229 z 24 lipca 2012 r., s. 34
Cytowane przez
Pokaż
ISSN
0209-0961
Język
pol
Udostępnij na Facebooku Udostępnij na Twitterze Udostępnij na Google+ Udostępnij na Pinterest Udostępnij na LinkedIn Wyślij znajomemu