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Sosnowska Honorata (Warsaw School of Economics, Poland)
Banzhaf Value for Games Analyzing Voting with Rotation
Operations Research and Decisions, 2014, vol. 24, no. 4, s. 75-88, tab., bibliogr. 13 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Teoria gier, Gry kooperacyjne, Zastosowanie teorii gier, Decyzje wyborcze
Game theory, Cooperative game, Application of game theory, Voting decisions
Europejski Bank Centralny (EBC)
European Central Bank (ECB)
The voting procedure has been presented with rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. The main game theoretical approaches have been presented elsewhere. That paper considered the Shapley value computed in accordance with these approaches. The Banzhaf value has been analysed and the results compared with the results for the Shapley value. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Pełny tekst
  1. BANZHAF J., Weighted voting doesn't work. A mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 19 (2), 317-343.
  2. BELKE A., VON SCHURBEIN B., European Monetary Policy and the EBC Rotation Model. Voting Power of the Core versus Periphery, Discussion Paper 983, DIV Berlin 2010.
  3. BELKE A., STYCZYNSKA B., The allocation of power in the enlarged EBC Governing Council. An assessment of the EBC rotation model, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, 44 (5), 865-897.
  4. EBC Monthly Bulletin, European Central Bank, Frankfur am Main, July 2009.
  5. GRABISCH M., ROUBENS M., An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games, International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, 28, 547-565.
  6. KOSIOR A., ROZKRUT M., TOROJ A., Rotation scheme of the EBC Governing Council. Monetary policy effectiveness and voting power analysis, [in:] Report on the participation of the Republic of Poland in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union, National Bank of Poland, 2008, 53-102.
  7. MACHOVER M., Notions of a priori voting power. Critique of Holler and Windgren, Homo Oeconomicus, 2000, 16, 415-425.
  8. MESTERTON-GIBBONS M., An introduction to game theoretic modelling, American Mathematical Society, 2001.
  9. OWEN G., Game theory, 3rd Ed., Academic Press, San Diego 1995.
  10. SHAPLEY L.S., A value for n-person games, [in:] H.W. Kuhn, A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games, Vol. 2, Annals of Mathematical Studies 28, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1953, 307-317.
  11. SHAPLEY L.S., SHUBIK M., A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system, American Political Science Review, 1954, 48, 787-792.
  12. SOSNOWSKA H., Analysis of voting method used in the European Central Bank, Operations Research and Decisions, 2013, 23, 75-86.
  13. ULRICH K., Decision making of the EBC. Reform and voting power, Discussion Paper, No. 04-70, ZEW, Mannheim 2004.
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