BazEkon - Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

BazEkon home page

Meny główne

Autor
Waśniewski Krzysztof (Krakowska Szkoła Wyższa im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego w Krakowie)
Tytuł
Instytucjonalny model strategii korporacyjnych
Institutional model of corporate strategies
Źródło
Ekonomia / Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2012, nr 29, s. 6-33, bibliogr. s. 31-33
Słowa kluczowe
Decyzje inwestycyjne, Korporacje, Teoria gier
Investment decisions, Corporation, Game theory
Uwagi
summ.
Abstrakt
Prezentowany w niniejszym artykule model decyzji inwestycyjnych korporacji oparto na pojęciu strategii, określanej na sposób behawioralny, jako zbiór zachowań. Decyzje inwestycyjne w modelu są racjonalne lecz nieoptymalne, podejmowane są w warunkach ryzyka, w wyniku kolektywnego procesu moderacji obiektywnych konfliktów interesów między interesariuszami korporacji. Dla formalizacji modelu wykorzystano nowatorskie połączenie trzech nagrodzonych ekonomiczną Nagrodą Nobla teorii gier: dynamicznej równowagi Johna Nasha, gier z niedoskonałą informacją Johna Harsanyiego oraz gry ekstensywnej Reinharda Seltena. (fragment tekstu)

The present paper presents a model of investment decisions made by corporations. The decisions in question are perceived as part of corporate strategies, defined in a behavioural way. The model attempts to integrate the classical microeconomics' point of view with that of the new institutional economics, formalizing the resulting assumptions on the grounds of three theories of games: Selten's, Harsanyi's and Nash's. Corporate strategies are defined as a set of four games: the capital market game, the corporate governance game, the product markets game and the social responsibility game. The four games are played in parallel and in mutual interaction, each of them being a temporarily normalized sub-game of the Selten's extensive game with imperfect recall, and being played as a Harsanyi's game with imperfect information and various degrees of cooperation. In each of the four games the presence of Nash's dynamic equilibrium, manifested as a critical level of consistency in individual players' strategies, is of crucial importance. In presence of Nash's dynamic equilibrium, corporations orient their behaviour towards development, technological progress included. In the absence of Nash's dynamic equilibrium corporations would orient their strategies exclusively on managing risk. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Pełny tekst
Pokaż
Bibliografia
Pokaż
  1. Alchian A.A., 1950, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory. "The Journal of Political Economy", Vol. 58, Issue 3, s. 211-221.
  2. Alchian A.A., Demsetz H., 1972, Production, In formation Costs, and Economic Organization, "The American Economic Review", Vol. 62, No. 5. (December), s. 777-795.
  3. Andersen E.S., 2004, Population Thinking, Price's Equation and the Analysis of Economic Evolution, "Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review", Vol. 1, No. 1, November, s. 127-48.
  4. Ansoff H.I., 1965, Corporate strategy: an analytic approach to business policy for growth and expansion, McGraw, Hill, New York.
  5. Aoki M., 2007, Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes, Stanford University, revised version of an invited lecture at the 2005 World Congress of the International Economic Association in Morocco.
  6. Berle A.A., Means G.C., 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan Publishing Co, New York.
  7. Chandler A.D., 1962, Strategy and Structure: chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge.
  8. Chandler A.D., 1977, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
  9. Coase R.H., 1937. The Nature of the Firm. "Economica", November, s. 386-405.
  10. Demsetz H. 1968. The Cost of Transacting, "Quarterly Journal of Economics", February, No. 82, s. 33-53.
  11. Fama E.F., Jensen M.C., 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control. "Journal of Law and Economics", Vol. XXVI, June.
  12. Golbe D.L., White L.J., 1993. Catch a Wave: The Time Series Behaviour of Mergers. "Review of Economics and Statistics", No. 75, s. 493-497.
  13. Greif A., 2006, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press, N.Y.
  14. Harsanyi J.C., 1953. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking. "The Journal of Political Economy", Vol. 61, Issue 5, s. 434-435.
  15. Harsanyi J.C., 1966, À General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations, "Econometrica", Vol. 34. No. 3. s. 613-634.
  16. Harsanyi J.C., 1967, Games With Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model "Management Science", Vol. 14, No. 3, s. 159-182.
  17. Harsanyi J.C., 1968. Games With Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points, "Management Science". Vol. 14. No. 5, s. 320-334.
  18. Hodgson G.M., Knudsen T., 2004, The Complex Evolution of a Simple Traffic Convention: The Functions and Implications of Habit. "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization", Vol. 54, No. 1, s. 19-47.
  19. Hodgson G.M., Knudsen T., 2006a, Dismantling Lamarckism: Why Descriptions of Socio-Economic Evolution as Lamarckian are Misleading. "Journal of Evolutionary Economics". 2006. vol. 16. no. 4. October, s. 343-66.
  20. Hodgson G.M., Knudsen T., 2006b, The Nature and Units of Social Selection, "Journal of Evolutionary Economics", Vol. 16, No. 5, December, s. 477-89.
  21. Hodgson G.M., Knudsen T., 2006c, Why We Need a Generalized Darwinism: and Why a Generalized Darwinism is Not Enough. "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization", Vol.61, No. 1, September, s. 1-19.
  22. Hurwicz L., 1960, On the Dimensional Requirements for Non-wasteful Resource Allocation Systems, w: K.J. Arrow, S. Karlin i P. Suppes (red.), The Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
  23. Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H., 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. "Journal of Financial Economics", October, Vol. 3. No. 4, s. 305-360.
  24. Kaldor N., 1935, Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity. "Economica", No. 2. s. 33-50.
  25. Knight F.H., 1921, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, wyd. I, Hart, Schaffner & Marx, Houghton Mifflin Company. Boston. The Riverside Press. Cambridge.
  26. Kuhn H.W., 1953, Extensive Games and The Problem of Information, w: Contributions to The Theory of Games, Princeton University Press, s. 193-216. reprint: Kuhn H.W. (red.) Classics in Game Theory. Princeton University Press 1997, s. 46-68.
  27. Learned E.P., Christensen C.R., Andrews K.R., Guth W.D., 1965, Business policy: text and cases, Irwin, Homewood.
  28. Mintzberg H., Waters J.A., 1985, Of strategies, deliberate and emergent, "Strategic Management Journal", No. 6. s. 257-272.
  29. Nash J.F., 1950, Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America", Vol. 36, No. 1, s. 48-49.
  30. Nash J.F., 1950a, The Bargaining Problem, "Econometrica", Vol. 18. No. 2. s. 155-162.
  31. Nash J.F., 1951. Non-Cooperative Games. "The Annals of Mathematics. Second Series", Vol. 54. Issue 2, s. 286-295.
  32. Nash J.F., 1953, Two-Person Cooperative Games, "Econometrica", Vol. 21, Issue 1, s. 128-140.
  33. Nelson R., Winter S., 1982, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
  34. Penrose E., 1959, The Theory of The Growth of The Firm, Oxford University Press.
  35. Quinn J.B., 1980, Strategies for change: logical incrementalism, Irwin, Homewood.
  36. Selten R., 1975, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, "Journal International Journal of Game Theory", Issue Volume 4, o. 1, reprint: Kuhn H.W. (red.), Classics in Game Theory, Princeton University Press, 1997, s. 317-354.
  37. Von Neumann J., Morgenstern O., 1947, The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
  38. Waśniewski K., 2009, Dynamic Equilibrium of a Market and Corporate Strategies - A Game Theoretic Approach, May the 11th, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1402570.
  39. Williamson O.E., 1975, Markets and hierarchies, Free Press, New York.
  40. Williamson O.E., 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting, Free Press, New York.
  41. Williamson O.E., 1991, Strategizing, economizing and economic organization, "Strategic Management Journal", No. 12, s. 75-94.
Cytowane przez
Pokaż
ISSN
0137-3056
Język
pol
Udostępnij na Facebooku Udostępnij na Twitterze Udostępnij na Google+ Udostępnij na Pinterest Udostępnij na LinkedIn Wyślij znajomemu