- Autor
- Lenells Jonatan (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden), Stea Diego (Department of Strategic Management and Globalization, Frederiksberg, Denmark), Foss Nicolai J. (Department of Strategic Management and Globalization, Frederiksberg, Denmark)
- Tytuł
- Optimal Contracting under Adverse Selection: The Implications of Mentalizing
- Źródło
- Contemporary Economics, 2015, vol. 9, nr 2, s. 215-232, rys., bibliogr. 17 poz.
- Słowa kluczowe
- Selekcja personalna, Psychologia, Informacja
Personnel selection, Psychology, Information - Uwagi
- summ.
- Abstrakt
- We study a model of adverse selection, hard and soft information, and mentalizing ability-the human capacity to represent others' intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. By allowing for a continuous range of different information types, as well as for different means of acquiring information, we develop a model that captures how principals differentially obtain information on agents. We show that principals that combine conventional data collection techniques with mentalizing benefit from a synergistic effect that impacts both the amount of information that is accessed and the overall cost of that information. This strategy affects the properties of the optimal contract, which grows closer to the first best. This research provides insights into the implications of mentalizing for agency theory.(original abstract)
- Pełny tekst
- Pokaż
- Bibliografia
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- Cytowane przez
- ISSN
- 2084-0845
- Język
- eng
- URI / DOI
- http://dx.doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897-9254.168
