BazEkon - Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

BazEkon home page

Meny główne

Kamishiro Yusuke (Kanto Gakuin University)
On the Core of a Cost Allocation Problem Under Asymmetric Information
Operations Research and Decisions, 2015, vol. 25, no. 1, s. 17-32, rys., tab., bibliogr. 23 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Koszty, Asymetria informacji
Costs, Information asymmetry
We study a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information, and show that the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty. We also obtain a non-emptiness result for the incentive compatible coarse core, which is one concept of an interim core. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Pełny tekst
  1. BIRD C.G., On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theory approach, Networks, 1976, 6 (4), 335-350.
  2. CLAUS A., KLEITMAN D.J., Cost allocation for a spanning tree, Networks, 1973, 3 (4), 289-304.
  3. DUTTA B., KAR A., Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games, Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48 (2), 223-248.
  4. DUTTA B., VOHRA R., Incomplete information, credibility, and the core, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2005, 50 (2), 148-165.
  5. FORGES F., The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 47 (2), 135-151.
  6. FORGES F., MERTENS J.-F., VOHRA R., The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects, Econometrica, 2002, 70 (5), 1865-1892.
  7. FORGES F., MINELLI E., VOHRA R., Incentive and the core of an exchange economy: a survey, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002, 38 (1-2), 1-41.
  8. FORGES F., SERRANO R., Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems, International Game Theory Review, 2013, 15 (2), 301-317.
  9. GRANOT D., HUBERMAN G., Minimum cost spanning tree games, Mathematical Programming, 1981, 21 (1), 1-18.
  10. HOLMSTRÖM B., MYERSON R., Efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information, Econometrica, 1979, 51 (6), 1799-1819.
  11. HOUGAARD J.L., An introduction to allocation rules, Springer, Berlin 2009.
  12. KAMISHIRO Y., The ex ante incentive compatible core of the minimum cost spanning tree games, Keizaikei (Kanto Gakuin Economics Journal), 2013, 257, 11-21.
  13. KAMISHIRO Y., SERRANO R., Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2011, 36 (3), 552-567.
  14. MAS-COLELL A., WHINSTON M.D., GREEN J.R., Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York 1995.
  15. MYERSON R.B., Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica, 1979, 47 (1), 61-74.
  16. MYERSON R.B., Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information, Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136 (1), 260-285.
  17. SCARF H., The core of an n-person game, Econometrica, 1967, 35 (1), 50-69.
  18. SERRANO R., VOHRA R., Information transmission in coalitional voting games, Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 134 (1), 117-137.
  19. SHAPLEY L.S., On balanced sets and core, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1967, 14 (4), 453-460.
  20. VOHRA R., Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core, Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, 86 (1), 123-147.
  21. WILSON R., Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica, 1978, 46 (4), 807-816.
  22. YOUNG H.P., Monotonic solutions of cooperative games, International Journal of Game Theory, 1985, 14 (2), 65-72.
  23. YOUNG H.P., Cost allocation, [in:] R. Aumann, S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 2, Elsevier Science, 1994, 1193-1235.
Cytowane przez
Udostępnij na Facebooku Udostępnij na Twitterze Udostępnij na Google+ Udostępnij na Pinterest Udostępnij na LinkedIn Wyślij znajomemu