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Autor
Stolarczyk Piotr (Uczelnia Łazarskiego w Warszawie)
Tytuł
The ESM - What is Behind the Propositions?
ESM - Co się kryje za jego propozycjami?
Źródło
Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna, 2015, nr 1 (48), s. 42-68, wykr., tab., bibliogr. s. 63-66
Słowa kluczowe
Kryzys finansowy, Europejski Pakt Stabilności i Wzrostu, Polityka stabilizacyjna
Financial crisis, Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), Stabilisation policy
Uwagi
streszcz., summ., rez.
Firma/Organizacja
Unia Europejska (UE)
European Union (EU)
Abstrakt
Kryzys zadłużenia ujawnił poważne luki w systemie zarządzania gospodarczego Unii Europejskiej. Po pierwsze, zasady Paktu Stabilności i Wzrostu (SGP) okazały się całkowicie nieskuteczne, ponieważ nie uchroniły Unii Europejskiej przed konsekwencjami nieodpowiedzialnej polityki fiskalnej. Po drugie, okazało się, że strefa euro nie miała instrumentów zarządzania w sytuacji kryzysowej, co uniemożliwiło podjęcie stosownych działań. W maju 2010 roku UE rozpoczęła szukanie odpowiedzi, jak wyjść z kryzysu. Powołano specjalne fundusze ratunkowe, aby zapobiec rozprzestrzenianiu się kryzysu w całej Europie. W artykule autor analizuje jakość podejmowanych wówczas decyzji oraz skuteczność tworzonego mechanizmu pomocy. (abstrakt oryginalny)

The debt crisis revealed serious gaps in the hitherto economic management system of the European Union. First of all, the principles of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) turned out to be completely ineffective, since they did not prevent the European Union from getting into trouble as a result of irresponsible fiscal policy. Secondly, it became clear that the euro area had no instruments for management in a critical situation, which made it impossible to undertake relevant actions. In May 2010, the EU started to look for an answer to the question how to overcome the crisis. Special rescue funds were established to prevent the crisis from spreading all over Europe. In the article, the author analyses the quality of the EU decission (at the moment the decisison was taken) and the potential effectivness of the proposed aid system architecture. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
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Bibliografia
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ISSN
2081-5913
Język
eng
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