- Autor
- Dall'Aglio Marco (LUISS University, Italy), Fragnelli Vito (University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy), Moretti Stefano (CNRS and Université Paris-Dauphine, France)
- Tytuł
- Orders of Criticality in Voting Games
- Źródło
- Operations Research and Decisions, 2016, vol. 26, no. 2, s. 53-67, tab., bibliogr. 7 poz.
- Słowa kluczowe
- Teoria gier, Głosowanie, Gry kooperacyjne
Game theory, Voting, Cooperative game - Uwagi
- summ.
One of the authors (S.M.) benefited from the support of the French National Research Agency (ANR) project NETLEARN (grant no. ANR-13-INFR-004) - Abstrakt
- The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been extended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other players. (original abstract)
- Dostępne w
- Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka SGH im. Profesora Andrzeja Grodka
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu - Pełny tekst
- Pokaż
- Bibliografia
-
- AUMANN R.J., MASCHLER M., The bargaining set for cooperative games, [in:] M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley, A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1964, 443.
- BANZHAF J.F., Weighted voting doesn't work. A mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 19, 317.
- CHESSA M., FRAGNELLI V., The bargaining set for sharing the power, Annals of Operations Research, 2014, 215, 49.
- DUBEY P., NEYMAN A., WEBER R.J., Value theory without efficiency, Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 6, 122.
- FRAGNELLI V., OTTONE S., SATTANINO R., A new family of power indices for voting games, Homo Oeconomicus, 2009, 26, 381.
- SHAPLEY L.S., A value for n-person games, [in:] H.W. Kuhn, A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1953, 307.
- SHAPLEY L.S., SHUBIK M., A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system, American Political Science Review, 1954, 48, 787.
- Cytowane przez
- ISSN
- 2081-8858
- Język
- eng
- URI / DOI
- http://dx.doi.org/10.5277/ord160204
