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Autor
Sánchez-Soriano Joaquín (Miguel Hernandez University of Elche, Spain), Llorca Natividad (Miguel Hernandez University of Elche, Spain), Algaba Encarnación (University of Seville, Spain)
Tytuł
An Approach from Bankruptcy Rules Applied to the Apportionment Problem in Proportional Electoral Systems
Źródło
Operations Research and Decisions, 2016, vol. 26, no. 2, s. 127-145, tab., bibliogr. 36 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Bankructwo, Wybory parlamentarne, System wyborczy, Studium przypadku
Bankruptcy, Parliamentary election, Voting system, Case study
Uwagi
summ.
Natividad Llorca and Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano are thankful for the financial support from the Spanish Government (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, MINECO) and FEDER funds through project MTM2014-54199-P and from the Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia through grant 19320/PI/14
Kraj/Region
Hiszpania
Spain
Abstrakt
(Discrete) bankruptcy problems associated with apportionment problems have been defined. The authors studied which allocations for apportionment problems have been obtained when (discrete) bankruptcy rules were applied to the associated bankruptcy problems. They have shown that the (discrete) constrained equal losses rule coincides with the greatest remainder method for apportionment problems. Furthermore, new properties related to governability have been proposed for apportionment methods. Finally, several apportionment methods satisfying governability properties have been applied to the case of the Spanish Elections in 2015. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka SGH im. Profesora Andrzeja Grodka
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
Pełny tekst
Pokaż
Bibliografia
Pokaż
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Cytowane przez
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ISSN
2081-8858
Język
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.5277/ord160208
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