- Autor
- Peters Hans (Maastricht University, Netherlands), Timmer Judith (University of Twente, Netherlands), Van Den Brink Rene (Free University of Amsterdam)
- Tytuł
- Power on Digraphs
- Źródło
- Operations Research and Decisions, 2016, vol. 26, no. 2, s. 107-125, tab., bibliogr. 18 poz.
- Słowa kluczowe
- Teoria gier, Indeks siły
Game theory, Power index - Uwagi
- summ.
- Abstrakt
- It is assumed that relations between n players are represented by a directed graph or digraph. Such a digraph is called invariant if there is a link (arc) between any two players between whom there is also a directed path. We characterize a class of power indices for invariant digraphs based on four axioms: Null player, Constant sum, Anonymity, and the Transfer property. This class is determined by 2n - 2 parameters. By considering additional conditions about the effect of adding a directed link between two players, we single out three different, one-parameter families of power indices, reflecting several well-known indices from the literature: the Copeland score, ß- and apex type indices. (original abstract)
- Dostępne w
- Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka SGH im. Profesora Andrzeja Grodka
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu - Pełny tekst
- Pokaż
- Bibliografia
-
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- Cytowane przez
- ISSN
- 2081-8858
- Język
- eng
- URI / DOI
- http://dx.doi.org/10.5277/ord160207
