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Moldovan Andrei (Universidad de Salamanca, Spain)
Presumptions in Communication
Studia Humana, 2016, vol. 5(3), s. 104-117, bibliogr. 26 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Komunikowanie, Współpraca, Poglądy filozoficzne
Communication, Cooperation, Philosophical thought
In the first part of this paper I consider the Gricean account of communication, as structured by the Cooperative Principle and the four maxims. Several authors, including Jean Goodwin [10], Fred Kauffeld [17], Michael Gilbert [7], Ernie Lepore and Mathew Stone [22], among others, argue that the Gricean view of communication fails in as much as it pretends to offer an account of all such human interactions. As Goodwin and Kauffeld suggest, a more promising starting point is to consider the variety of contextually determined presumptions that we make about speakers and that we rely upon in interpreting utterances. These presumptions are established in various ways, and are dropped, or defeated, in certain conditions. In order to clarify these aspects we need to inquiry into the nature of presumptions. I argue that Kauffeld's [18], [19], [20] account of presumptions is useful in this context. In the second part of the paper I look at what this account tells us about how, and in what conditions, presumptions in communication are rebutted.(original abstract)
Pełny tekst
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  4. Bermejo-Luque, L. Assessing presumptions in argumentation: Being a sound presumption vs. being presumably the case. OSSA Conference Archive, Paper 22, 2013.
  5. Eemeren, F. H., van, Grootendorst, R. Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions. Foris Publications: Dordrecht-Holland/Cinnaminson-U.S.A, 1984.
  6. Eemeren, F. H., van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., Jacobs, S. Reconstructing argumentative discourse. U. Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, 1993.
  7. Gilbert, M. Familiars: Culture, Grice and Super-Duper Maxims. In. D. Mohammed, M. Lewiński (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon, 2015, vol. 2, College Publications: London, 2016, pp. 431-438.
  8. Godden, D., Walton, D. A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation. Pragmatics and Cognition, 15 (2), 2007, pp. 313-346.
  9. Godden, D. Presumptions in argument: Epistemic versus social approaches. In. F. Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th Biennial Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2011, CD-ROM. Windsor, ON: OSSA, 2011, pp. 1-13.
  10. Goodwin, J. The noncooperative pragmatics of arguing. In. Pragmatics in 2000: Selected papers from the 7th International Pragmatics Conference, vol. 2, 2001, pp. 263-277.
  11. Govier, T. A Practical Study of Argument. Wadsworth: Belmont, 2010.
  12. Green, G. M. The universality of Gricean interpretation. Proceedings of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, 16, 1990, pp. 411-428.
  13. Grice, H. P. Meaning. The Philosophical Review, 66, reprinted in Grice 1989, (1957), pp. 377-88.
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  15. Grice, H. P. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Harvard, 1989.
  16. Hansen, H. Theories of Presumptions and Burdens of Proof. OSSA Conference Archive, 2003.
  17. Kauffeld, F. J. Grice without the Cooperative Principle. OSSA Conference Archive, 2001.
  18. Kauffeld, F. J. The ordinary practice of presuming and presumption with special attention to veracity and the burden of proof. In. F. H. v. Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Williard, A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Anyone Who has a View: Theoretical Contributions to the Study of Argumentation, Kluwer Academic Publications: Dordrecht, 2003, pp.132-146.
  19. Kauffeld, F. J. Presuming and presumption in everyday argumentation: A response to Godden and Walton. In. M. Guarini, S. Pender (eds.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of the Eighth OSSA Conference, Ontario Society for the Study of Argument: Windsor, 2009.
  20. Kauffeld, F. J. The epistemic relevance of social considerations in ordinary day-to-day presumptions. OSSA Conference Archive, Paper 87, 2013.
  21. Leech, G. N. Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics. Benjamins, 1980.
  22. Lepore, E., Stone, M. Imagination and Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2015.
  23. Siegel, H. Presumptions in argument: Epistemic versus social approaches. OSSA Conference Archive, 2011.
  24. Stampe, D. On the Acoustic Behavior of Rational Animals. University of Wisconsin: Madison, 1967.
  25. Ullman-Margalit, E. On presumption. Journal of Philosophy, 80 (3), 1983, pp.143-163.
  26. Walton, D. N. The speech act of presumption. Pragmatics and Cognition, 1 (1), 1993, pp.125-148.
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