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Autor
Stefaniak Małgorzata (University of Gdansk, Poland), Urbaniak Rafał (University of Gdansk, Poland)
Tytuł
Varieties of Legal Probabilism : a Survey
Odmiany probabilizmu prawnego - przegląd
Źródło
Decyzje, 2018, nr 30, s. 33-52, tab., bibliogr. 48 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Prawdopodobieństwo, Prawo, Podejmowanie decyzji
Probability, Law, Decision making
Uwagi
streszcz., summ.
Funding for this research was provided by Narodowe Centrum Nauki (National Science Centre), grant No. 2016/22/E/HS1/00304
Abstrakt
Probabilizm prawny to pogląd, że teoria prawdopodobieństwa może być użyta do eksplikacji standardów decyzji prawnych dotyczących faktów. O ile narzędzia probabilistyczne są czasami używane w sądzie, to skonstruowanie ogólnego modelu, który pozwoliłby na ocenę dowodów, stanowi wyzwanie. Probabilizm prawny zmaga się z takimi trudnościami jak problem koniunkcji, problem dotyczący koroboracji czy paradoks widza bez biletu (gatecrasher paradox). Problemy te należy rozwiązać zanim przystąpimy do tworzenia ogólnego modelu. W niniejszym przeglądzie omawiamy wspomniane trudności oraz proponowane w literaturze sposoby ich rozwiązania. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Legal Probabilism is the view that mathematics, and probability theory in particular, can be used to explicate the standard of legal decisions. While probabilistic tools are sometimes used in courtrooms, the construction of a general model of evidence evaluation remains a challenge. Conceptual diffi culties facing Legal Probabilism include the diffi culty about conjunction, the diffi culty about corroboration and the gatecrasher paradox. These problems need to be addressed before we construct a general model. In this survey we discuss the three diffi culties and present some theories proposed as their solutions. (original abstract)
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Bibliografia
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  12. Cohen, L.J. (1981). Subjective probability and the paradox of the gatecrasher. Arizona State Law Journal, 2(2), 627-634.
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  42. Taroni, F., Biedermann, A., Bozza, S., Garbolino, P., Aitken, C. (2006). Bayesian networks for probabilistic inference and decision analysis in forensic science. John Wiley & Sons.
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Cytowane przez
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ISSN
1733-0092
Język
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.112
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