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Autor
Matuszak Piotr (Poznań University of Economics and Business), Totleben Bartosz (Poznań University of Economics and Business), Piątek Dawid (Poznań University of Economics and Business)
Tytuł
Political Alignment and the Allocation of the COVID-19 Response Funds - Evidence from Municipalities in Poland
Źródło
Economics and Business Review, 2022, vol. 8 (22), nr 1, s. 50-71, rys., tab., bibliogr. 47 poz
Słowa kluczowe
Alokacja kapitału, Pomoc publiczna, Polityczne aspekty ekonomii, COVID-19
Capital allocation, Public aid, Political aspects of economics, COVID-19
Uwagi
Klasyfikacja JEL: D72, H54
summ.
Abstrakt
This paper aims to analyse the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds from the perspective of the political alignment hypothesis. The authors focus on the allocation of the second and third rounds of the Governmental Fund for Local Investments (part of the COVID-19 Response Fund) in Poland. Using the logit and OLS models and the regression discontinuity design the authors show that mayors aligned with the central government were significantly more likely to receive the funds, as well as in higher per capita values, than mayors aligned with the opposition or unaligned with any party in parliament when the allocation was based on a discretionary decision. The results support the political alignment hypothesis and highlight the danger of partiality in the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie
Biblioteka SGH im. Profesora Andrzeja Grodka
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Poznaniu
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Bibliografia
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Cytowane przez
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ISSN
2392-1641
Język
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2022.1.4
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