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Autor
Teterycz Agnieszka (Uniwersytet Warszawski), Białek-Jaworska Anna (Uniwersytet Warszawski), Woźniak Michał (Uniwersytet Warszawski), Piosik Monika (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie)
Tytuł
Do Gaming Companies Benefit from the IP Box Tax Rate? Multinational, Polish and Wielkopolskie Voivodeship Perspective
Czy spółki sektora gier komputerowych odnoszą korzyści z IP Box? Perspektywa międzynarodowa, polska i województwa wielkopolskiego
Źródło
Rozwój Regionalny i Polityka Regionalna / Instytut Geografii Społeczno-Ekonomicznej i Gospodarki Przestrzennej Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, 2022, nr 62, s. 303-323, rys., tab., bibliogr. 50 poz.
Słowa kluczowe
Gry komputerowe, Spółki, Przedsiębiorstwo, Podatki, Programy komputerowe
Computer games, Companies, Enterprises, Taxes, Computer programs
Uwagi
streszcz., summ.
Kraj/Region
Wielkopolska
Wielkopolska
Abstrakt
Celem artykułu jest weryfikacja wpływu obniżonej stawki podatkowej IP BOX na przy-chody spółek z branży gier komputerowych oraz prawa Gibrata stwierdzającego, że wzrost firmy jest niezależny od jej wielkości. Dynamiczne modele panelowe oszacowane metodą GMM, FE dla danych panelowych i MNK, opracowano na danych 673 spółek z 11 krajów. Wykazano, że małe firmy z branży gier komputerowych rosną szybciej niż ich więksi rywale. Tym samym odrzucono prawo Gibrata. Nie potwierdzono, że IP Box wspiera wzrost przedsiębiorstw z wyjątkiem województwa wielkopolskiego. Większe szanse na korzyści z IP Box (obniżona do 5% stawka podatku dochodowego obowiązująca w Polsce od 2019 r.) mają firmy o bardziej istotnych i dynamicznych zmianach kapitałochłonności, aktywów niematerialnych i zapasów. Branża gier wideo w Wielkopolsce odnosi większe korzyści z IP Box niż w pozostałej części Polski.(abstrakt oryginalny)

This article aims to verify the impact of the reduced IP Box tax rate on the revenues of gaming companies and Gibrat's Law stating that firm growth is independent of a company's size. The dynamic panel-data models estimated in this article using GMM, FE panel data and OLS methods were created based on data of 673 companies from 11 countries. We show that small gaming firms are growing faster than their larger rivals. Thus, we reject Gibrat's Law. We did not find evidence that IP Box supports the firm's growth except for the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship. More chances for IP Box's (reduced to 5% income tax rate being in force in Poland since 2019) effects are given to firms with more remarkable and dynamic changes in capital intensity, intangibility and inventory. The gaming industry in Wielkopolska benefits more from IP Box than the rest of Poland.(original abstract)
Pełny tekst
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Bibliografia
Pokaż
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Cytowane przez
Pokaż
ISSN
2353-1428
Język
eng
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/rrpr.2022.62.17
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