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Autor
Suder Jacek (Narodowy Bank Polski)
Tytuł
Perspektywy internacjonalizacji chińskiego renminbi
Prospects for The Internationalization Process of the Chinese Renminbi
Źródło
Bank i Kredyt, 2024, nr 6, s. 785-807, aneks, bibliogr. s. 797-799
Bank & Credit
Słowa kluczowe
Internacjonalizacja, Rynki finansowe, Waluta międzynarodowa, Renminbi (RMB), Wojna w Ukrainie
Internationalization, Financial markets, International currency, Renminbi (RMB), War in Ukraine
Uwagi
Klasyfikacja JEL: E52, F02, F31, G15
streszcz., summ.
Abstrakt
Celem artykułu jest analiza faktycznych postępów internacjonalizacji renminbi. Zdaniem wielu badaczy dzięki swoim powiązaniom handlowym chińska waluta może stać się ważną walutą rezerwową - po dolarze amerykańskim i euro - oraz kluczowym składnikiem trójelementowego międzynarodowego systemu walutowego. Jednocześnie bardzo istotne w tym procesie jest zaangażowanie chińskich władz. W tym kontekście w artykule w pierwszej kolejności scharakteryzowano rozwój systemu kursu walutowego w Chinach oraz rolę renminbi w globalnym rynku walutowym. Następnie przedstawiono postępy w tym procesie oraz bariery ograniczające uzyskanie przez renminbi statusu międzynarodowej waluty rezerwowej. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na ostatni okres, w którym ożywiły się działania zmierzające do dedolaryzacji globalnej gospodarki. Nałożenie sankcji gospodarczych na Rosję i zablokowanie jej aktywów rezerwowych w wyniku agresji na Ukrainę spowodowały wzrost zainteresowania alternatywnymi sposobami wymiany handlowej i poszukiwanie innych możliwości utrzymywania rezerw finansowych - w tym zmianę struktury koszyka posiadanych walut rezerwowych oraz zakupy fizycznego złota. Na koniec zwrócono także uwagę na działania państw grupy BRICS mające na celu stworzenie systemu walutowego alternatywnego wobec amerykańskiego dolara. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Over recent years, there have been numerous attempts to question the US dollar's special position in the international monetary system. Recently, factors such as the decreased rating of the United States, increased geopolitical tensions with China and the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia have resulted in renewed discussion in this area. As a result, researchers of the de-dollarization process have become more convinced that the Chinese renminbi may become an alternative reserve currency to the US dollar. In order to analyze the progress of the renminbi internationalization process, first of all, the stages of development of the exchange rate system in China and the role of the Chinese currency in the global financial market were presented. According to IMF data, the share of the renminbi in the basket of currencies representing official currency reserves increased to 2.58% in 2023. At the same time, the Chinese currency is the fifth most frequently traded currency in the world (with a share of 7%; according to BIS data) and the sixth currency used in international payments (with a share of 1.66%; according to SWIFT data). On the other hand, according to ECB data, the global value of bonds that are denominated in Chinese currency represents less than 1% of the total international bond issuance. The use of RMB as a currency in international lending, i.e. by lenders residing outside China, is also negligible. The above factors prove that the current importance of the renminbi for the global financial market is small. Nevertheless, some researchers believe that China's path to obtaining a reserve currency may take a non-standard form. In their opinion, the Chinese currency can use its trade connections for this purpose. At the same time, the involvement of the Chinese state authorities is very important in this process. In this context, China has already established a nationwide trade settlement mechanism, created numerous currency swap lines and developed offshore markets. In addition, the PBoC launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, an alternative to the US SWIFT system, ensured the inclusion of the renminbi in the basket of special drawing rights (SDR) currencies, and made progress in developing a digital yuan. The process of internationalization of the renminbi also accelerated as a result of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The imposition of economic sanctions on Russia and the blocking of its reserve assets resulted in an increase in interest in alternative methods of trade and the search for other options for maintaining financial reserves - including changing the structure of the basket of reserve currencies held and purchases of physical gold. Apart from China and Russia, the group of countries significantly interested in moving away from the dollar in trade settlements were in this case the countries belonging to the BRICS group. Finally, the barriers hindering the process of obtaining the status of an international reserve currency for the renminbi were also characterized. These include geopolitical tensions between the US and China, incomplete openness of the Chinese capital and financial market, capital flow control, and lack of full exchange rate flexibility. As a result, if China's economy returns to growth in the future and progress is made in institutional reforms, the renminbi can be expected to gradually improve its international position in the reserve currency structure, mainly in terms of international payments, transactions and reserves. Additional RMB can be a key element of the three-track international monetary system. (original abstract)
Dostępne w
Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach
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Bibliografia
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Cytowane przez
Pokaż
ISSN
0137-5520
Język
pol
URI / DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0054.9090
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